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ABSTRACT 
The National Credit Act (NCA) was promulgated and implemented on 1 June 
2007. The purpose of this research study was to outline the residential mort-
gage market in South Africa in the context of the NCA and to determine how 
residential mortgage lending under the new NCA was regulated. The purpose of 
the NCA was to remove the many unfair practices, inappropriate disclosure and 
anti-competitive practices from the market and to achieve honesty in the credit 
market. Low-income groups were held back because they could not gain access 
to formal finance to build or improve houses or supplement housing subsidies to 
get bigger houses. This study applied the quantitative research design using 
time series secondary data. Registered data on monthly residential mortgages 
was obtained from Lightstone Property for the period January 2001 to August 
2011. Secondary data was collected from the BA900 of the SARB to see how 
many loans were approved and rejected between 2008 and 2014. The 
statistical analysis techniques used in this study were t-tests, descriptive 
statistics, trend analysis and correlation analysis. It was found that the NCA had 
a positive effect on the residential mortgages in SA.  
Key terms: 
Banks, consumers, credit, credit providers, lending, mortgage, National Credit 
Act, National Credit Regulator, regulation, residential mortgages 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTUALISATION  
OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this study the focus is on the impact of the National Credit Act (NCA) 34 of 
2005 on residential mortgage lending. This chapter provides the background, 
motivation and purpose for conducting the research. An introductory literature 
review on the NCA will then be provided, which includes the background of the 
study, an explanation of housing financing in South Africa and the economy of 
South Africa, the problem statement and the objectives of the study. Statistical 
analysis and the research methodology will be discussed, followed by the key 
definitions, limitations and ethical considerations of the study. The chapter lay-
out will then be presented. 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 
This section deals with the potential problems that might occur with key sections 
of the NCA, in particular limiting access to credit by the poor (Goodwin-Groen & 
Kelly-Louw, 2006:43). Before the Act, the granting of credit by financial insti-
tutions to consumers was approved without properly investigating whether the 
consumer would be able to repay the debt or not. In order to address this 
situation, the NCA was promulgated and implemented on 1 June 2007. 
Section 3 of the NCA states (South Africa 2005): 
“The purpose of this Act is to promote and advance the social and economic 
welfare of South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, 
responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry, and 
to protect consumers” (Goodwin-Groen and Kelly-Louw, 2006:43). The purpose 
of the Act is to protect the consumers and to create a fair credit market. 
According to Masilo (2014:50), the NCA aims to improve the standard of living 
of consumers by: 
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 prohibiting certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practices; 
 promoting responsible credit granting and use, thus prohibiting reckless 
credit granting; 
 providing for debt reorganisation in cases of over-indebtedness; 
 regulating credit information; 
 providing for registration of credit bureaux, credit providers and debt coun-
selling; 
 establishing national norms and standards relating to consumer credit; 
 promoting a consistent enforcement framework relating to consumer credit; 
 repealing the Usury Act 73 of 1968 and the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 
1980 and to provide for related incidental matters; and 
 establishing the National Credit Regulator and the National Consumer 
Tribunal. 
To sum up, the NCA aims to improve fair and non-discriminatory access to and 
granting of credit and to protect consumers against abuse (De Clercq 2013). 
Previously there was an imbalance of power between consumers and credit 
providers because of low education levels, inadequately informed consumers, 
weak disclosure and deceptive marketing practices (Stoop 2009:366). As a re-
sult, many South African consumers entered into unaffordable credit contracts, 
which led to many social problems (Stoop, 2009:366). 
The NCA replaced the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 and the Usury Act 73 
of 1968. According to Mould (2008:110), 
“some legislation protects consumers, while other legislation has a broader 
application-field”. 
The Usury Act and the Credit Agreements Act put a ceiling on the interest rate 
charged by credit providers, but this limit was bypassed when credit providers 
charged extra costs such as credit life assurance, loan application fees, admin-
istration fees, club fees and other service charges (Masilo, 2014:48). According 
to Masilo (2014:48), these Acts did not protect consumers and neither did they 
provide any regulation in terms of either the credit providers or the credit bu-
reaux and resulted in credit providers giving credit irresponsibly and ultimately 
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sequestrating the consumer (Masilo, 2014:48). The Usury Act was first imple-
mented in 1968 in South Africa during the apartheid era and it excluded finan-
cial support to non-whites, especially black people, and raised serious concerns 
(Whittaker, 2008:570). The Minister of Trade instituted a Usury Act exemption in 
1992 that allowed lenders to charge unregulated interest rates on small loans 
and the purpose was to stimulate growth in lending to micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises (Whittaker, 2008:570). 
During 1968 the consumer credit market was influenced by a range of political, 
social and economic changes (Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-Louw, 2006:12). The 
dysfunctional credit market was based on the following problem areas: 
 Fragmented and outdated legislation; 
 Ineffective consumer protection, particularly in relation to 85% of the popu-
lation in low-income groups; 
 High cost of credit and, for some areas, lack of access to credit; 
 Rising levels of over-indebtedness; and 
 Reckless behaviour by credit providers and exploitation of consumers by 
micro-lenders, intermediaries, debt collectors and debt administrators (De-
partment of Trade and Industry (DTI) 2004b). 
Improper legislation, whether the Usury Act, Credit Agreements Act or debt 
collection procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, and a need for 
enforcement all added to the improper state of affairs (Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-
Louw, 2006:13). The increasing use of credit by low-income groups also added 
to the need for a closer examination of the credit legislation (Goodwin-Groen & 
Kelly-Louw, 2006:12). The DTI formed a technical committee to undertake a 
credit law review in 2004, with the mandate to solve these problems (Goodwin-
Groen & Kelly-Louw, 2006:13). The committee recognised the following weak-
nesses in the credit market (Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-Louw, 2006:14): 
 Insufficient rules on disclosing the cost of credit. This means that, through 
the inclusion of a variety of fees and charges (including excessive credit life 
assurance), the cost of credit was regularly inflated above the disclosed 
interest rate. 
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 An unrealistically low Usury Act cap caused low-income and high-risk 
clients to be marginalised. 
 Weak and incomplete credit bureaux information resulted in bad client 
selection, ineffectual credit risk management and high bad debts, hugely 
increasing the cost of credit. 
 Poor debt collection and personal insolvency legislation created an incen-
tive for reckless credit provision, and prevented effective rehabilitation of 
over-indebted consumers. 
 Excessive predatory behaviour led to high levels of debt for certain con-
sumers and unmanageable risk to all credit providers. 
 Lack of regulation in legislation related to mortgages and property transfers 
weakened consumers’ ability to offer security and locked them into high-
cost, unsecured credit. 
 Aspects of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 and National Payment System Act 78 
of 1998 rules weakened competition in the consumer credit markets. 
 There was regulatory uncertainty leading to credit behaviour oriented to-
wards short-term profit taking, and resistance among credit providers to offer 
longer-term finance. 
The Credit Law Committee examined all the previous Acts and concluded that 
the Usury Act and the Credit Agreements Act should be replaced by a single 
Act. This led to the National Credit Act (NCA) 34 of 2005 which came into effect 
on 1 June 2007 (Masilo, 2014:49). 
The Credit Agreements Act and Usury Act protected consumers to a certain 
amount of debt, but when these debts exceeded the ceiling for the relevant 
legislation’s field of application, the extended credit (debt) was no longer con-
sidered consumer credit (Mould, 2008:110). The Usury Act allowed money-
lenders to charge the middle-to-well-off groups realistic interest rates but higher 
interest rates were charged for the lower-income groups, meaning that credit 
was more difficult to access for the lower-income groups than for the middle-to-
well-off groups (Mould, 2008:110). The Credit Agreements Act regulated only 
specific credit agreements linked to moveable goods. 
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The NCA applies to credit granted to natural persons by banks, retailers, micro-
lenders and all other credit providers. The main purpose of the NCA is to pro-
mote a fair, competitive, accessible and equitable credit market. 
1.3 HOUSING FINANCING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack 
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (Le Roux, 2011:6; United 
Nations 1948). 
In general, people want security and for their basic needs to be provided for. 
The importance of housing as a vital need and as a component of the economy 
cannot be over-emphasised. It is predicted that on average, between 15% and 
40% of household monthly expenditure is spent on housing and housing 
services (Okpala, 2012:182). According to Kajimo-Shakantu and Evans (2006: 
24), housing also represents about 2% to 10% of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in some developing countries. For that reason it is important to under-
stand the operation of and potential for housing finance (Kajimo-Shakantu & 
Evans, 2006:23). 
Le Roux (2011:14) states that the South African White Paper 1994 is built 
around seven strategies: 
i) Stabilising the housing environment; 
ii) Mobilising housing credit; 
iii) Subsidies; 
iv) Supporting the People’s Housing Process; 
v) Rationalising institutional capacities; 
vi) Facilitating the speedy release and servicing of land; 
vii) Co-ordinating state investment in development. 
The white paper 1994 gives a background of the housing system in the past. 
Housing in South Africa has a long history of government interference, charac-
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terised by the post-apartheid drive towards private ownership via public pro-
vision (Lemanski, 2012:337). South Africa’s housing landscape was deeply 
influenced by apartheid, and that is why the present cannot be fully understood 
without grasping the past (Lemanski, 2012:337). The first democratic election in 
South Africa was in 1994 and the newly instituted government inherited a back-
log of 1.2 to 2.5 million houses. This inherited backlog was the product of the 
history of apartheid, unemployment and poverty (Pillay & Naude, 2006:873). 
After 1994, the ANC government promised to build 1 million houses for low-
income households. Providing housing for the poor was its main concern 
(Lemanski, 2012:337). The ANC government used the subsidy scheme to sup-
port the development of black entrepreneurs and did not want to depend on the 
old apartheid construction (Gilbert, 2004:23). The government involved the 
banks to finance low-income groups when it realised that it lacked the capacity 
to finance the ambitious subsidised housing scheme (Gilbert, 2004:23). 
Between 1994 and 1997 the demand for houses increased from 2.5 million to 3 
million households (Pillay and Naude 2006:873). Banks provided home loans to 
low- and moderate-income groups of South Africa (Pillay & Naude, 2006:873). 
In 1994 an approximately 20% of the new lending was not performing and 
banks stopped lending (Porteous, 2005:34). During this time South African 
housing finance was in a mess and banks experienced defaults on home loans 
because of political boycotts and social disobedience of the past. The default 
rate was estimated to be 15% and worth R10 billion in 1994 (Pillay & Naude, 
2006:873). 
In 1994, 34 000 properties were owned by the banks and the state-owned 
mortgage lender, Khayalethu Home Loans, as a consequence of non-perform-
ing loans. This caused lenders to withdraw from the low- and moderate-income 
groups (Pillay & Naude, 2006:873). Subsequent to 1994, the new government 
started a plan to persuade commercial banks to offer financing to low- and 
moderate-income groups despite high defaults. This plan involved campaigns to 
persuade people to pay off their bonds, and policies that encouraged the intro-
duction of government subsidies to deliver housing on scale (Pillay & Naude, 
2006:873). Housing on scale entailed the programmes carried out by the three 
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layers of government that mass produced housing via housing subsidies. This 
was the beginning of the capital subsidy scheme to assist the low-income 
market. The Provincial Housing Boards (PHB) initially managed the subsidy 
scheme and in 2000 the government made the Provincial Member of the Ex-
ecutive Council (MEC) responsible for the subsidy allocation (Pillay & Naude, 
2006:873). 
One million subsidies were allocated from 1995–2001. People who earned less 
than R1 500 per month received 90%, people who earned R1 501 – R2 500 per 
month received 8% and those who earned less than R3 500 per month received 
the outstanding balance (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 
2000:18). The housing policy of South Africa states that in order to offer a 
satisfactory standard of housing to low-income households who earn less than 
R3 500 per month, affordable housing financing is needed (Tomlinson, 2007: 
77). While early houses were as small as 25 m², subsidy houses were a mini-
mum of 30 m² after 1998 and were known as Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) houses (Lemanski, 2012:337). 
Since the late 1980s, South Africa has sought ways to extend housing finance 
to low-income households. During this period housing finance institutions 
looked for ways of supporting borrowers in the low-income market, including 
risk mitigation and acting as guarantors and as wholesale providers (Tomlinson, 
2007:78). The majority of the low-income group depended on the subsidies 
from the government. During 1992, a new non-racial housing policy was formu-
lated and created by a multi-party body, the National Housing Forum (NHF) 
(Tomlinson, 2002:8). According to Tomlinson (2002:8), fierce debates followed 
on whether housing should be delivered by the state or the market; whether the 
standard of the house should be four-roomed houses or progressive and how to 
draw the financial institutions back which had previously been forced out due to 
bond boycotts and the wildly fluctuating economy in South Africa. During the 
apartheid government, white South Africans received abundant resources and 
economic opportunities, including housing services, while other groups were 
denied these opportunities (Freeman, 2008:697). 
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Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the main objective of the NHF has been the 
provision of credit for low-income groups by increasing engagement with banks 
in the high-risk low-income housing finance sector (Freybote and Karoly 2008: 
185). The house policy was drafted in 1992 to 1993 to draw financial institutions 
back into the developing black housing market (Tomlinson, 2007:78). A once-off 
paid capital subsidy was also part of the policy, which involved R3 500 per 
month to all households with an income less than this amount (Department of 
Housing (DOH) 2004) as described in Table 1.1. In 1994 this increased to R12 
500, but over time the subsidy increased to R31 879 as described in Table 1.1 
(Tomlinson, 2007:78). 
Table 1.1: South African government housing subsidy scheme amounts 
Monthly household income Subsidy amounts: 2005 
R0 – R1 500 R31 879 
R1 500 – R3 500 R29 400 plus own contribution R2 479 
Source:  Adapted from Tomlinson (2007) 
According to Kajimo-Shakantu and Evans (2006:24), studies proved that due to 
the declining value of subsidies together with the lack of end-users funding, the 
private sector developers cut costs by building smaller units on cheaper peri-
pheral land. It must be kept in mind that a subsidy is inefficient when assisting 
people in a housing shortage, but in its defence, it was never intended to be the 
only housing instrument (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans, 2006:24). The 2004 Break-
ing New Ground (BNG) programme was announced, due to the failure of the 
national housing subsidy scheme to solve South Africa’s housing shortage 
(Lemanski, 2012:339). BNG encourages property ownership as a poverty-alle-
viating asset for wealth creation and empowerment by seeking to produce 
settlements that are viable, unlike the previous RDP, which concentrated on 
mass delivery of an end product (i.e. a house) (Lemanski 2012:339). BNG con-
sists of nine elements or programmatic interventions and seven objectives, as 
depicted in Table 1.2, and they are a combination of substance, procedure and 
outcomes, outputs and inputs (Rust 2006:10). BNG can be understood to set 
out the ends to be attained, the means to reach them and the instruments to be 
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utilised in the process (Rust, 2006:10). Financial institutions were encouraged 
to re-enter the low-income market and a number of institutions were estab-
lished. 
Table 1.2: BNG elements and objectives 
BNG elements BNG objectives 
Supporting the entire residential 
property market 
Accelerate the delivery of housing as a key 
strategy for poverty alleviation 
Moving from housing to sustainable 
human settlements 
Utilise the provision of housing as a major job 
creation strategy 
Using existing and new housing 
instruments 
Ensure that property can be accessed by all 
as an asset for wealth creation and 
empowerment 
Adjusting institutional arrangements 
within Government 
Leverage growth in the economy 
Building institutions and capacity Combat crime, promote social cohesion and 
improve quality of life for the poor 
Defining financial arrangements Support the functioning of the entire single 
residential property market to reduce duality 
within the sector, by breaking the barriers 
between the first economy residential property 
boom and the second economy slump. 
Creating jobs and housing Utilise housing as an instrument for the 
development of sustainable human 
settlements, in support of spatial restructuring. 
Building information, communication 
and awareness 
 
Establishing systems for monitoring 
and evaluation 
 
Source:  Rust (2006:10) 
The housing subsidy programme received some mixed comments. Gilbert 
(2004) discusses the issue of subsidies and says that capital housing subsidies 
have reduced problems in financing houses in Chile and perhaps South Africa. 
Governments intervene in housing markets due to the negative externalities 
caused by conflict between the objectives of the borrowers and investors 
(Flanagan, 2012:507). The main housing objective in developed countries says 
Flanagan (2012:507), is to give every citizen the opportunity of a decent, well-
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built home at an affordable price, in environmentally sustainable communities 
where they want to live and work. In other words, borrowers that want to buy a 
decent mortgage must be able to afford it and not default on their payments. 
Branco, Meljer and Visscher (2012:613) emphasise that houses should be safe, 
usable, healthy and comfortable for their tenants and visitors. 
Flanagan (2012:507) explains that the main objective for mortgage investors is: 
“All mortgage investors should expect to earn a predictable and sustainable re-
turn over the term of the mortgage with all risks equitable and fairly divided”. 
This means that lenders or investors want to earn returns on their investments 
and the risks must be divided fairly amongst them. 
Most low-income groups experience barriers in accessing financing to meet 
their housing needs (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans 2006:24). There is a difference 
between the demand requirements of poor households and the supply 
requirements of the formal finance sector (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans 2006: 
24). For instance, loan size, period of loan repayment, consistency of the prin-
cipal repayments, the language used for writing loan conditions and an 
acceptable form of security must be considered (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans 
2006:24). Section 63 of the NCA states that a consumer has the right to receive 
any document in terms of this Act in an official language that the consumer can 
read or understand (Mould, 2008:115). It is fair to presume that when the 
consumer signs the credit agreement, in this case a home loan agreement, 
provided that the necessary information was supplied by the credit provider, the 
agreement is understood by the consumer (Mould, 2008:115). 
According to Le Roux (2011:15), nearly 70% of South African households do 
not have access to housing credit via the formal banking sector. For govern-
ment to help this section of the population, numerous programmes have been 
developed (Le Roux, 2011:15). In general, there are two main areas of focus: 
households with a joint income of less than R3 500 per month (nearly 40% of 
the affected group) and the remaining 30% of the affected group, who have a 
combined household income of more than R3 500 per month. These groups 
have access to housing credit through the formal banking sector (Le Roux 
2011:15). 
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Housing finance in South Africa is largely determined by two factors: cost of 
funding and the risk of lending in the different markets (Pillay and Naude 
2006:883). Low-income groups are held back because they cannot gain access 
to formal finance to build or improve houses or supplement housing subsidies to 
get bigger houses (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans, 2006:26). Le Roux (2011:5) 
defines low-income housing (in the South African context) as housing for people 
whose combined monthly household incomes are below R3 500 per month. The 
majority of the low-income households in South Africa are dependent on the 
government for housing subsidies, but the value of the subsidy declines and 
there is a complicated approval and pay-out mechanism (Kajimo-Shakantu & 
Evans, 2006:26). Banks are reluctant to operate in the low-income group hous-
ing market, and this unwillingness worsens the housing shortage problem in the 
country (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans, 2006:26). 
Pillay and Naude (2006) and Kajimo-Shakantu and Evans (2006) came to the 
conclusion that the banks are reluctant to finance houses in the low-income 
households. This contributes to the housing shortage in the country. From the 
above discussion it is clear that housing is not simply a matter of ‘bricks and 
mortar’, but a very complicated issue informed by many different factors beyond 
the influence of the individual or the government (Le Roux 2011:28). 
1.4 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF SOUTH AFRICA 
The private sector credit industry cannot be separated from the South African 
economy; neither can the effect of the NCA be investigated without taking into 
account the effect of unemployment, inflation, interest rates, etc. (Luttig, 2010:4). 
The year 1994 marked South Africa’s first non-racial democratic government. 
The new South African government inherited an economy with problems which 
included high unemployment, a fiscal shortage of more than 7% of GDP and 
high inflation above 10% per annum (Hodge, 2009:488). There was a break-
through after 2000; inflation met its target of 3 – 6% per annum for more than 
three years in a row in 2007 and South Africa saw its first budget surplus in the 
same year (Hodge, 2009:488). Since 2000, South Africa has undergone a sig-
nificant consumption-driven economic growth with an average of 4% annually. 
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This can be credited mainly to low inflation, a stronger rand and increased real 
disposable household income (Freybote & Karoly, 2008:180). 
In 2006 the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the lead regulator for the 
South African banking sector, increased the interest rate by 200 basis points 
due to higher food and oil prices and a weaker rand (Freybote & Karoly, 
2008:180). As of 2014, inflation was about 5.5%, the repo rate was 5% and the 
prime rate at which banks lent to the public was 9.5% (SARB 2014). In 2007 
South Africa achieved a GDP growth rate of more or less 5% for the fourth year 
in succession, and this sustained strength in consumer demand was reinforced 
by higher levels of employment, higher real incomes and household balance 
sheets that improved (Luttig, 2010:9). 
South Africa has over 47 million people with an annual growth rate of 1.4% in 
2008; 61% of this total comprised the urban population (Makina, 2012:410). 
Economic growth increased in 2008, in spite of the recession caused by various 
factors, including the increases in interest rates by the SARB, inflation and the 
lack of confidence of consumers and business, all indirectly from the foreign 
credit crisis (Hodge, 2009:488). Regardless of the positive economic growth, 
unemployment rate still increased in the early 1990s. The unemployment rate 
increased between 1995 and 2003, from 17 – 28% and from 29 – 42% (based 
on the narrow definition of unemployment), and from 29 – 42% (based on the 
broad definition of unemployment) (Hodge, 2009:489). Consequently, South 
Africa now has one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world, even as 
per the official narrow (but potentially misleading) definition (Hodge, 2009:489). 
The six-year moving average growth trend is portrayed in Figure 1.1 from 1947–
2007. The figure depicts the high levels of growth in the 1950s and 1960s, 
declining afterwards from the early 1970s, hitting rock bottom in the early 
1990s, before recovering from this historic low (Hodge, 2009:489). The average 
growth rate in the 1990s was not much different from that of the 1980s (1.4% to 
2.1%) and the economy grew on average by 0.1% per annum from 1990–1994 
and by 2.6% per annum from 1995–1999 (Hodge, 2009:490). 
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Figure 1.1: Annual and six-year moving average growth in real gross value (RGV) in South 
Africa (1947–2007) 
Source:  Adapted from Hodge (2009:49) 
In 2008, the inflation rate was closer to 10% and there was an increase in living 
expenses (Luttig, 2010:15). In spite of higher than normal wage settlements, the 
average increase was lower than the average CPIX, lowering households’ dis-
posable income (Luttig, 2010:15). The sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008 in the 
United States of America (USA) affected the mortgage market of the world. 
South Africa survived the crisis due to SARB’s strict regulations and controls. 
The SARB is the lead regulator for the South African banking sector. 
South Africa (SA) is a peripheral player, which means that the country’s well-
being depends on its exports. It is the largest producer of mineral commodities, 
including platinum, gold and chromium (Freeman, 2008:702). Even though the 
country escaped the global recession of 2008, the eurozone debt crisis can 
harm SA because SA is the European Union’s largest trading partner in Africa 
(Moss, 2011). The crisis occurred because Europe took on too much debt and 
this led to downgrading by the rating agencies. The eurozone challenges could 
be controlled as long as they are limited to small economies (Greece, Ireland 
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and Portugal), whose individual GDP is less than 3% of the eurozone total 
(Steinbock, 2013:109). In 2011, Spain and Italy joined the gallery and they 
account for 30% of regional GDP, which is too big for their economies to fail 
(Steinbock, 2013:109). Europe is SA’s second largest trading partner (Moss, 
2011) and this could put a damper on the economic growth.  
1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether mortgage lending is 
better or worse off since the implementation of the NCA. In terms of the NCA, 
mortgage lending to an individual should be undertaken after carrying out due 
diligence on a prospective client. It can be argued that the due diligence re-
quired of banks by the NCA does disadvantage some mortgage finance appli-
cants in several respects. Firstly, the fact that an individual’s creditworthiness is 
assessed on current income does not take into account the individual’s future 
income and the long-term nature of mortgage finance. In essence, it is contrary 
to the life cycle theory of consumption as propagated by Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954; 1980). Secondly, the assessment of creditworthiness is based 
entirely on regular verifiable sources of income. It does not take into account 
informal sources of income (e.g. remittances) that sometimes may be dominant 
in low-income groups (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). The result is that the NCA 
could actually work against the low-income segment of the population, the very 
segment which authorities sought to protect. Thirdly, the NCA is based on an 
individualistic society and not a communal society as is present in the low-
income segment of the population of South Africa. In a communal society, an 
individual’s creditworthiness may be group-based, something that banks do not 
take into account in their assessment. An individual who seeks a mortgage loan 
is not independent, but could be representing many family members who will 
live in the same household and assist in the repayment of the loan. It can thus 
be hypothesised that the NCA has negative effects on residential mortgage 
financing of the low-income segment of the population. 
Since the Act came into effect on 1 June 2007, it is not known what its impact 
has been on residential mortgage lending in South Africa. This study investi-
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gated how the NCA has impacted on residential mortgage lending. It focused on 
residential mortgages which are regulated by the Act. It should be noted that 
commercial and farm mortgages are not regulated by the NCA. 
The impact of the NCA on mortgage lending in general was discernible from 
trends of mortgage lending prior to and post-implementation of the Act. This 
was gleaned from an empirical analysis of volumes of mortgages granted over 
several years. 
1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This study aimed to investigate the impact that the NCA has had on residential 
mortgage applications through banks over the period 2001–2011. The following 
secondary objectives were formulated: 
i) To determine if the NCA has had a positive or negative impact on resi-
dential mortgage financing in South Africa. 
ii) To determine whether implementation of the NCA affected the acceptance 
rates of total mortgage lending. 
iii) To examine the trend of residential mortgages after the implementation of 
the NCA. 
iv) To determine the effect of the implementation of the NCA on further ad-
vances on mortgages in South Africa. 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.7.1 Quantitative research 
Since the date of the implementation of the NCA is known, the applications be-
fore and after implementation could be analysed using the t-test. T-tests are 
used to assess the significance of individual b-coefficients, and particularly 
testing the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero (Tustin, 
Ligthelm, Martins & Van Wyk, 2005:657). In order to minimise the effects of 
confounding factors such as external shocks that cannot be fully controlled, the 
time series of monthly approved, residential mortgage applications in the year 
prior to implementation of the NCA were compared with the time series of 
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monthly approved applications from 2008. The reason for using data from 2008 
is that prior to 2008 there might be variances and discrepancies in the data, as 
some definitions changed between the old DI900 and new BA900 forms and 
there were also some differences between the accounts included/not included 
by the banks prior to 2008. DI900 was replaced by BA900. BA900 comprises of 
data on individual banks, institutional level as well as aggregated total and must 
be merged with the balance sheet that banks and mutual banks submit for bank 
supervision (SARB, 2016). 
Using a t-test for comparison, testing proceeded with the analysis of the time 
series of monthly mortgage applications data under the following assumptions: 
 The data is quantitative and plausibly normally distributed, or at least amen-
able to application of the Central Limit Theorem. 
 The samples of pre- and post-NCA mortgage data come from distributions 
that may differ in their mean value, but not in the standard deviation. 
 The mortgage data pre- and post-NCA is independent of each other. 
The latter assumption is the most important as it enables observations of pre-
NCA mortgage data to be separated from those post-NCA. The t-test for inde-
pendent samples and descriptive statistics were therefore used for analysis. 
Trend analysis was also used for analysis. 
1.7.2 Data collection 
Registered data on monthly residential mortgages was obtained from Lightstone 
Property for the period January 2001 to August 2011. Secondary data was 
collected from the BA900 of the SARB to see how many loans were approved 
and rejected between 2008 and 2014. The target group was banks in South 
Africa. The weakness of using secondary data (i.e. information is collected for 
purposes other than the study) was not applicable in this study as banks need 
to comply with the NCA and the compliance information is exactly what was 
needed for the purpose of the study. 
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1.8 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
The following statistical analysis techniques were used for each of the objectives 
above: 
Objective 1: T-test (comparison of means), descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis and trend analysis 
Objective 2: Trend analysis using mortgage number and value 
Objective 3: Trend analysis using mortgage number and value 
Objective 4: T-test (comparison of means), descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis and trend analysis 
1.9 KEY DEFINITIONS 
Consumers can be defined as those who buy, obtain and use all kinds of goods 
and services (Khuzwayo, 2013:8). 
According to Khuzwayo (2013:10), credit is a trade practice to which goods or 
services are supplied to a receiver, and where the parties agree that the re-
ceiver is allowed to pay for the goods or services at a future date. 
Credit agreement can be defined as a credit facility, where a credit provider 
agrees to supply goods and services or to pay certain amounts to the con-
sumers or on the behalf of consumers (Mlandu, 2007:5). 
A credit provider with regard to a credit agreement to which the Act applies 
means the party responsible for the provision of goods or services under a 
discount transaction, an instalment agreement or an incidental credit agreement 
(Stander, 2012:12). 
According to Le Roux (2011:3), housing can be described as a broad term that 
includes houses, flats and other housing typologies, as well as infrastructure 
and can include the whole residential neighbourhood, including public spaces. 
A home loan means a loan or advance by a financial institution to a person for 
purposes of constructing, purchasing, renovating or improving in any way such 
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person’s home, with the security of a registered mortgage bond or any other 
form of accepted security (Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act 63 of 
2000). 
A financial institution is any bank or mutual bank registered as such under the 
Banks Act 94 of 1990, or the Mutual Banks Act 124 of 1993, or any other regis-
tered financial institution whose business is, in full or in part, either the accept-
ance of deposits from the general public, the advance of credit to persons or 
both such acceptance and advance, with the security of a registered mortgage 
bond or any other form of accepted security, for the purpose of providing home 
loans (Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act 63 of 2000). 
According to Luttig (2010:3), over-indebtedness is when individuals are not able 
to pay all their debts in a timely manner, which leads to feelings of panic, stress 
and being overcome by the number and extent of these overdue debts. 
Regulation is generally defined as a set of enforceable rules that limit or direct 
the actions of market participants and as a result modify the outcomes of these 
actions (Davids, 2008:17). 
A mortgage bond can be defined as an agreement between borrower and 
lender, binding upon third parties once it is registered against the title of the 
property that upon default the lender will be entitled to have the property sold in 
satisfaction of the outstanding debt (Brits, 2012:39). 
The NCA is a new piece of consumer legislation aimed specifically at regulating 
the consumer credit market, and was implemented in full force during 2007 
(Brits, 2012:4). 
1.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Limitations of the study can be explained as factors that may have an impact on 
the interpretation of the findings or on the generalisability of the results (Moaisi, 
2013:65). This study depended on the availability of time series data on mort-
gage lending in South Africa. Moreover, such data ideally had to be stratified in 
terms of Living Standard Measures (LSM) of clients to evaluate the impact on 
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the most vulnerable group in the population. However, mortgage data collected 
by the SARB is publicly available in aggregate format. Due to confidentiality 
issues, providers of mortgage finance were not helpful. 
Another major limitation of the study is that the trend of mortgage lending can-
not only be explained by the NCA. There are a number of factors or rather 
intervening factors other than the NCA that could have affected mortgage 
lending. The challenge was to separate the effect of such factors from those of 
the NCA. These factors could be the increase in interest rates and inflation. The 
financial crisis in the USA and Europe could also have played a role. 
A limitation of this study is that data was only available from 2001, restricting the 
number of observations to 51 on either side of the window period. As a con-
sequence of this limitation, the periods 2001–2005 and 2007–2011 were con-
sidered for the analysis. Another limitation of the study is that from 2001 to 
2007, the SARB only had data on total mortgages applied for and approved. 
However, data were available for total mortgages applied for and approved from 
January 2008. The data from the Reserve Bank data source (Basel I Form 
DI910) did not have the residential figures for January 2001 – December 2007. 
This is the reason why only total mortgages approved from January 2008 to 
January 2014 were considered. 
1.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Tustin et al. (2005:42) define ethics as “what is believed to be acceptable (good) 
or unacceptable (bad) in human behaviour”. Cooper and Schindler (2014:45) 
define ethics as “the norms or standards of behaviour that guide moral choices 
about our behaviour and our relationships with others”. Business ethics are “a 
sub-set of the values kept by society as a whole and are largely determined by 
family, educational and religious institutions” (Tustin et al., 2005:42). Research 
ethics link to questions about how the research topic is formulated and clarified, 
how the research is designed and access gained, how data is collected, pro-
cessed, analysed and stored, and the research is written up in a moral and 
responsible manner (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009:418). 
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Cooper and Schindler (2014:45) identify several ethical considerations at the 
research design stage: 
 The rights of the participant or subject must be protected. 
 The sponsor must receive ethically conducted and reported research. 
 Ethical standards must be followed when designing research. 
 The safety of the researcher and team must be protected. 
 The research team must follow the design. 
Secondary data was obtained from the SARB and from Lightstone Property. 
Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Review 
Committee of the University of South Africa (Unisa). This study conformed to 
the generally accepted norms and values as stipulated in the Unisa Research 
Ethics Policy document. 
1.12 SUMMARY AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In this chapter the background of the NCA was discussed, followed by the re-
search problem and questions. The rest of the chapters are set out as follows: 
 Chapter 2 contains a review of literature relevant to the study. Such litera-
ture relates to the theory of regulation in general and in particular the theory 
that pertains to the regulation of consumer credit. 
 In Chapter 3 the literature regarding the regulation of mortgage finance is 
reviewed and international practices in this regard are examined. 
 In Chapter 4 the methodology used to investigate the research objectives is 
described. This includes the nature of data collected and research techni-
ques applied. In addition, limitations of the methodology used are discussed. 
 Chapter 5 presents the results and their interpretations. The impact of the 
NCA on mortgage lending is discussed in this chapter and findings are 
compared to the predictions of theory and literature. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of the study and policy impli-
cations of the results are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MORTGAGE LENDING AND REGULATION:   
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of mortgage lending and the theories of 
regulation. 
2.2 MORTGAGE LENDING 
We live in a rapidly globalising world and our domestic economy is increasingly 
interdependent on the economies of other nations; this interdependence has 
provided great benefits to the world (Feldman, 2013:405). New challenges have 
appeared at the same time, including a severe strain on the capacity of US 
agencies to regulate. In response to these pressures, regulators have turned 
their attention outward and often participate with their foreign counterparts to 
complement regulatory standards (Feldman, 2013:405). 
Housing finance brings together complex multi-sector issues that are directed 
by frequently changing local features, for example the regulatory environment, 
political system, legal environment, culture and economic makeup (Chiquier & 
Lea, 2009). Although a mortgage market displays similarities across countries, it 
does differ from country to country due to differences in legal systems, cultural 
backgrounds and market infrastructure (Laferrère & Le Blanc, 2012:434). The 
penetration of housing finance has improved radically in developed economies 
since 1993 and residential mortgage markets represent between 50% and 100% 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the US, European countries, Japan and 
Australia (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). Housing finance is also developing in more 
emerging markets, although at different speeds and with different outcomes 
across countries (see Figure 2.1). It has also reached significant levels in a few 
middle-income countries (the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Malaysia, Chile, 
Baltic countries), with residential mortgage debt amounting to 20–35% of GDP 
over the last 20 years (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). 
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Housing finance over the past five years has also made inroads in quite a few 
other “latecomer” countries such as China, India, Thailand, Mexico, most of the 
new European Union (EU) countries, Morocco, Jordan and lately in many more 
countries, including Brazil, Turkey, Peru, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine where 
mortgage markets stand at 6–17% of the GDP (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). Improve-
ment is also detected in a few lower-income economies, including Indonesia, 
Egypt, Ghana, Pakistan, Senegal, Uganda, Mali, Mongolia and Bangladesh, but 
not on a large-enough scale to address some of the chronic housing issues they 
face (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). Housing finance remains available only to the mid-
dle and upper levels of the salaried income-distribution structure of households 
in most emerging economies, as depicted in Figure 2.1 (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). 
 
Figure 2.1:  Selected housing loans to GDP ratios 
Source:   Chiquier and Lea (2009) 
According to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the United Kingdom (UK) 
(Lunde, Scanlon & Whitehead 2011:41), 
“our policy approach to date has been underpinned by a view that mortgage 
consumers will act rationally to protect their own interests. We believe that we 
need to change that approach, recognise the behavioural biases of consumers 
and be more interventionist to help protect consumers from themselves” 
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This means that mortgage consumers must act more responsibly in order to 
make more informed decisions when it comes to their finances. It will also be to 
the consumers’ advantage to undergo consumer education. This regulatory divi-
sion has been criticised generally for being a result of regulatory history instead 
of rational policy (Nield, 2010:612). FSA regulation brings together the super-
vision of secured credit and the regulation of the financial institutions that 
primarily offer credit, particularly building societies and banks (Nield, 2010:612). 
According to Cummings (2008:96), the FSA has four statutory objectives: 
 Market confidence – to maintain confidence in the financial system; 
 Public awareness – to promote public understanding of the financial system; 
 Consumer protection – to secure a suitable degree of protection for con-
sumers; 
 The reduction of financial crime – to lessen the extent to which it is feasible 
for a business to be used for a purpose linked with financial crime. 
All these are supported by a set of principles of good regulation. This high level 
of regulatory inspection brings with it benefits, including consumer protection, 
but also strict penalties (Cummings, 2008:97). This means that all those in 
responsible positions in organisations must understand their regulatory respon-
sibilities and seek to fulfil them completely (Cummings, 2008:97). 
There are a number of different models for housing finance systems and in 
practice the majority are centred on the banking system, either directly or in-
directly (Boleat, 2003:4). Kajimo-Shakantu and Evans (2006:24) identify four 
basic models of housing finance, as shown in Table 2.1. Each model gives 
typical examples and a brief description of the housing finance. Most low-
income groups experience barriers in accessing financing to meet their housing 
needs (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans, 2006:24). There is a difference between the 
demand requirements of poor households and the supply requirements of the 
formal finance sector (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans, 2006:24). For instance, loan 
size, period of loan repayment, consistency of the principal repayments, the 
language used for writing loan conditions and an acceptable form of security 
must be considered (Kajimo-Shakantu & Evans, 2006:24). Mortgage lending is 
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simply a special type of bank lending and it would be foolish to regard it as 
separate from the housing finance system because in most countries banks are 
the most important lenders (Boleat, 2003:4). Credit Agricole is the largest lender 
in France, the savings banks are the biggest lenders in Germany and in America 
the commercial banks, directly and indirectly, are amongst the largest lenders 
(Boleat, 2003:4). 
Table 2.1: Basic models of housing finance 
Model 
Revolving credit 
system 
Specialised 
housing finance 
institutions 
Public 
financing 
Mortgage 
financing 
Typical 
examples 
Rotating savings sys-
tem and credit asso-
ciations 
Building 
societies 
Organisations 
and parastatals 
Commercial 
banks 
Brief 
description 
Common among the 
low-income group in 
developing countries, 
often supported by 
donor agencies. Use 
personal daily savings 
to create a ‘revolving 
fund’. 
Common in the 
UK (and in its 
former colonies). 
Though operate 
like banks, they 
mostly specialise 
in property. Use 
savings deposit-
ed by the public 
to provide home 
loans. 
Common in cen-
trally planned 
economies where 
public agencies 
direct finances to 
housing pro-
grammes based 
on public funds. 
Common, but 
highly con-
strained in devel-
oping countries. 
Use customers’ 
short-term sav-
ings (deposits) to 
lend for housing 
development on 
long-term basis 
(typically 10–30-
year mortgages). 
Source:  Adapted from Kajimo-Shakantu and Evans (2006:24) 
The consumer is seen by the neo-classical model of market regulation as a 
rational actor capable of making responsible borrowing decisions best suited to 
their needs, assisted by the provision of relevant, accurate and timely compara-
tive information (Nield, 2010:616). Lenders need to provide prescribed informa-
tion to the mortgagor before and during the course of the mortgage transaction, 
this is one of the fundamental principles underpinning the regulation of the 
home mortgage market, whether under the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA) or the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA) (Nield, 2010:616). 
Since 2007, housing and finance markets have experienced one of the greatest 
periods of instability in modern history (Lunde, Scanlon & Whitehead et al., 
2011:23). The boom in house prices was followed by a bust, the enormous 
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growth in the availability of mortgages was reversed and mortgage terms be-
came more limited (Lunde et al., 2011:23). The sub-prime mortgage crisis was 
a failure of responsibility at each level: borrowers, investors, lenders, investment 
banks, appraisers, rating agencies and the regulators (Schmudde, 2009:725). 
The problems were mainly serious in countries where high percentages of 
households had mortgages, where the amount of mortgage credit had increas-
ed and/or where debt levels were high (Lunde et al., 2011:25). The conse-
quences of the credit crunch shook the faith in the discipline of the market and 
its regulation, on principles of responsible lending and responsible borrowing 
(Nield, 2010:632). 
Promoting fair lending practices amongst financial institutions that provide home 
loans is the objective of South Africa’s Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(Itzikowitz, 2000:620). The Disclosure Act, which is based primarily on the US 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and to a minor extent on the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act (CRA), states that financial institutions that provide 
home loans should release their lending information in their financial statements 
and reports but does not force them to do so (Itzikowitz, 2000:620). The CRA, 
which was approved in 1977, stated that all banking institutions should be 
evaluated to see if they were meeting the credit needs of their local community 
satisfactorily; the Act did not anticipate that institutions would make high-risk 
loans (Schmudde, 2009:727). Some lenders display irresponsible decision-
making, by not executing sufficient checks on the borrower’s ability to repay and 
by promoting high-risk mortgages (Nield, 2010:632). Effective measures to en-
tail greater confidence in financial markets are being implemented and regula-
tors have tightened their grip (Nield, 2010:632). 
The traditional and still main mechanism for formal sector finance of housing in 
many countries is the retail depository institution where an institution gathers 
savings from households and enterprises and makes loans to homebuyers in 
this system (Figure 2.2) (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). By taking savings from non-
homebuyers, depository institutions can enter a wider pool of funds than via 
dedicated savings, including a stable stack of deposits at a reasonably cheap 
funding cost, as depicted in Figure 2.2 (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). 
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Figure 2.2:  Depository and direct lending 
Source:  Chiquier and Lea (2009) 
2.3 THEORIES OF REGULATION 
The regulation approach was created in the mid-1970s by a group of French 
economists who were concerned about analysing the regulation of the economy 
in its widest sense (Goodwin, 2012:22). They determined that capitalist growth 
depends on economic and extra economic factors (Goodwin, 2012:22). Pieterse 
(2009:28) defines the term “regulation” as a general term including: 
 regulation (the establishment of specific rules of behaviour); 
 monitoring (observing whether the rules are obeyed); 
 supervision (the more general observation of the behaviour of financial 
firms); 
 enforcement (ensuring that the rules are obeyed). 
James (2009:185) points out that regulation involves “the analysis of the way in 
which transformations of social relations create new economic and non-eco-
nomic forms, organised in structures that reproduce a determining structure, the 
mode of production”. The focus of regulation theory is on the medium- and long-
term workings of the capitalist system and how the system keeps long periods 
of relative stability through a unique outlook on the relationship between the 
capitalist system and the structures it operates in (Cocks, 2009:457). Regulation 
theory emphasises the variability and discrepancy of capitalism, and sees it as 
a social and economic system that is assessed as a social and economic sys-
tem and this is where the link to housing appears (Goodwin, 2012:22). 
Economic theory claims that regulators will try to maximise some objective func-
tion by implementing regulatory policies whereby certain interest groups will 
gain (Beard, Kaserman & Mayo, 2003:593). Even though regulators might not 
Banks and 
savings 
institutions 
Homebuyers Savers 
Loans Saving
Direct lending 
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care openly about the welfare of producers or consumers, the benefits and 
costs forced on sellers and buyers by regulation form the foundation of regulator 
rewards (Beard et al., 2003:593). Even though the economic theory of regula-
tion is given some level of discretion over the regulatory decisions made, regu-
latory commissions will implement policies that maximise their utility rather than 
some index of overall social welfare (Beard et al., 2003:593). 
The difference between economic and social regulation is that economic regu-
lation comprises structural and conduct regulation. Structural regulation is used 
for regulating market structure, whereas conduct regulation is used to regulate 
behaviour in the market (Den Hertog, 1999:234). Social regulation focuses on 
the environment, labour conditions, consumer protection and labour (Den Hertog, 
1999:234). This explains the linkage to housing, because different housing sys-
tems are linked in different ways to processes of production and consumption 
within a broad economic system like capitalism (Goodwin, 2012:22). 
According to Rethel (2012:124), the focus was on debt in the global financial 
crisis of 2008. It alerted us to the struggles faced by advanced economies, be 
these in the form of the difficulties caused by rapidly increasing levels of house-
hold debt, known as sub-prime loans in the USA, extended to riskier borrowers 
with poor credit records and little capacity to repay, or the current distress of the 
eurozone (Rethel, 2012:124). Attention was drawn to the heterogeneous and 
developing nature of debt itself, at least in those countries that were over-
whelmed in the crisis. Emerging market debt, by contrast, is still largely seen as 
a huge phenomenon and not a lot of attention has been paid to better under-
stand its complexities (Rethel, 2012:124). Until the late 1980s, government debt 
dominated the emerging market debt and the publicly guaranteed debt of state-
owned enterprises, normally in the form of bank loans (Rethel, 2012:126). This 
is no longer the case because privatisation led to the replacement of public debt 
by private corporate debt (Rethel, 2012:126). Access to credit has increasingly 
come to be seen as a public good over the last decades. With the active assis-
tance of donor governments and the international financial institutions, especial-
ly the World Bank, credit has been aimed at low-income classes in developing 
market economies through microfinance schemes (Rethel, 2012:138). 
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Making credit broadly available has become a public policy issue of increasing 
importance and it has served as a justification for the proliferation of exactly 
those forms of financial innovation that were at the centre of the global financial 
crisis (Rethel, 2012:138). The position of individuals has been empowered as 
their access to credit has been made easier (Rethel, 2012:138). 
At first glance, in many emerging market economies the increase in household 
debt seems to have been more than matched by a boost of asset ownership. 
However, experience suggests that asset and debt ownership are not equally 
distributed across the population regarding age, gender and income (Rethel, 
2012:138). More attention should be paid to the cyclical nature of house prices, 
because mortgages are the biggest single component of emerging market 
household debt (Rethel, 2012:138). 
There has been increasing public concern about scholarly attention to con-
sumer debt over the past two decades (Caputo, 2012:8). A rise in borrowing 
between families in the US was noticed in the 1990s as family debt and assets 
grew in tandem between 1989 and 1995 (Caputo, 2012:8). US household debt 
grew from about 60% of GDP in 1990 to nearly 100% in 2008, paralleling in-
creased personal consumption from about $5.32 trillion (in 2010 dollars) peaking 
at about $10.25 trillion (Caputo, 2012:8). From the 2008–2009 recession, a slow 
recovery triggered by the sub-prime mortgages-related financial crisis kept debt 
at the forefront of public concern even as interest rates subsequently reached 
lows not seen since the 1950s (Caputo, 2012:9). 
The financial crisis and recession have left a legacy of historically high and 
rising levels of public indebtedness across the advanced economies and the 
central discussion across Europe, Japan and the US is now on how to stabilise 
the rising public debt/GDP ratios, because post-crisis growth remains shaky 
(Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff 2012:69). Public debt overhang and slow growth 
are surely a simultaneous relationship: countries experiencing a period of slow-
er growth may be more vulnerable to ending up with very high levels of public 
debt, and once the public debt overhang arises, countries with slower growth 
are going to take longer to escape it (Reinhart et al., 2012:70). 
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Several leading banks in the US and Europe suffered from a sharp decline in 
the value of mortgage-backed securities which caused a broader financial 
collapse in summer of 2007 (Goodwin, 2012:26). Regulation theory permits us 
to see the impact of economic and social shifts on the development of housing 
consumption and production, but also allows us to analyse the contribution that 
housing and consumption make to these wider economic and social paths 
(Goodwin, 2012:26). 
The responsibility of setting regulations has been moved from municipalities to 
central governments with the general aim of creating more consistency (Branco 
et al., 2012:618). Regulation can be defined as the employment of one or more 
legal instruments for carrying out socio-economic policy objectives (Den Hertog, 
2010:3). A characteristic of a legal instrument is when government can force 
individuals or organisations to abide by the prescribed behaviour under penalty 
of sanctions (Den Hertog, 2010:3). Corporations may be obliged, for instance, 
to supply certain goods, to perceive certain prices, to be out of certain markets, 
to apply particular techniques in the production process or to pay the legal 
minimum wage (Den Hertog, 2010:3). Regulation can be classified into four 
elements which are best explained on a spectrum ranging between no 
regulation and statutory regulation, see Figure 2.3 (Blom, 2012:17). The change 
in the governance and in the economic environment leads to the need to put 
into action a regulatory framework. Through analysis of the different formats, 
the suitable model to implement would be ‘tacit’ self-regulation, as there is no 
governing or statutory body supporting the mortgage industry (Blom, 2012:17). 
No regulation Self-regulation Co-regulaton 
Statutory 
regulation 
No explicit controls 
on an organisation 
Regulations are 
specified, adminis-
tered and enforced 
by the regulated 
organisations 
Regulations are 
specified, adminis-
tered and enforced 
by a combination of 
the state and regu-
lated entities and 
the regulated or-
ganisation 
Regulations are 
specified, adminis-
tered and enforced 
by the state. 
Figure 2.3: Elements of regulation 
Source:  Blom (2012:17) 
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The theoretical design of effective regulatory mechanisms has been the topic of 
many papers (Blank & Mayo, 2009:235). South Africa follows a market-oriented 
approach with regard to the operation of economy, which means minimum inter-
ference by the authorities because the market mechanism is to achieve the 
highest efficiency in resource allocation (Davids, 2008:19). The South African 
government understands that intervention by the authorities is justified because 
of market imperfections (Davids, 2008:19). 
Credit direction has been used to defeat market failures in some countries and 
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 in the US seeks to prevent denying of 
services to underserved areas by insisting on banks’ minimum requirements to 
offer financial services (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). This approach in underdevel-
oped markets is fruitless if the basic environment remains weak, specifically in 
terms of sufficient funding and effective credit risk management tools (Chiquier 
& Lea, 2009). Quotas for home lending in Nigeria, e.g. 5–6% of total lending, 
were prescribed in the early 1980s, but remained useless because of the weak-
nesses of the lending environment, and despite sanctions provided by the Central 
Bank, regulation fell out in 1993 (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). 
According to Goodwin-Groen and Kelly-Louw (2006:16), the Wallis Report 
(1997) on the purpose of regulation states as follows: 
“The first purpose (of regulation), which applies in all sectors of the economy, 
is to ensure that markets work efficiently and competitively. Regulation for this 
purpose includes rules designed to promote adequate disclosure, prevent fraud 
or other unfair practices and prohibit anti-competitive behaviour such as collu-
sion or monopolisation. This type of regulation does not materially alter or pre-
scribe the nature of products or services, but simply aims to ensure that they 
are traded in fair and efficient markets.” 
This means that regulation must be fair and the markets it’s trading in must be 
efficient and competitive. 
Encouraging financial institutions to assist lower-income groups through con-
tractual arrangements can be a more successful approach, which can better take 
into account lenders’ constraints (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). South Africa chose this 
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path; in 2005 the largest commercial banks signed a memorandum of under-
standing with the government in which they devoted themselves to offer a 
certain volume of loans to the low-income market segment over four years in 
line with the broader 2003 Financial Sector Charter (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). 
According to Blank and Mayo (2009:238), the objective of the regulator is the 
maximisation of political support. The regulator is subjected to interest group 
pressures from consumers and firms (Blank & Mayo, 2009:236). This pressure 
results in an objective function for the regulator and includes profits, price and 
the regulated firm’s rate of return (Blank & Mayo, 2009:236). Regulation is cer-
tainly not an easy task and the ideal regulator needs to be independent of the 
government so that ministers are not able to force them to do things which 
make no viable sense for the lenders, e.g. lending at inefficient interest rates 
(Boleat, 2003:8). The regulator should not be single-mindedly concerned with 
protecting the financial health of the institutions they regulate and the easiest 
way to do this is to prevent them from making any loans (Boleat, 2003:8). 
A lot of regulatory bodies are primarily risk managers and they prevent some 
bad consequences within their field of regulation from affecting the public at 
large (Buttimer, 2011:15). They seek to identify, quantify and then ultimately 
handle the risk for which they have responsibility as risk managers (Buttimer, 
2011:15). They have limited resources and must place those resources where 
they will be most useful. Their risk management view either explains risk in a 
new way and leads the industry, or complements the understanding of risk 
within the regulated industry (Buttimer, 2011:15). The regulator must be a keen 
party in the overall objective of developing an effective mortgage market (Boleat, 
2003:8). 
The administrative state faces a crisis where regulators are charged with super-
vising complex realms of human action (Weber, 2012:738). The problem of 
regulator-bounded rationality arises as less of an obstacle to be conquered than 
a structural obstacle to effective policy (Weber, 2012:738). This problem is no-
where more apparent than in the financial sector, where today as in previous 
decades, regulators are liable for ensuring systemic financial stability and 
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supervising individual institutions, regardless of the increasingly complex market 
environment (Weber, 2012:738). 
It is fundamental to recognise that countries vary substantially in their stage of 
credit market development, profile of credit providers and products, level of 
credit penetration and regulator capacity (Davel, 2013:2). There are also large 
differences in credit market development within a country, including a certain 
population segment (e.g. civil servants or salaried workers) or geographic area 
(e.g. urban centres) which may be saturated while others still struggle with basic 
financial access. These factors affect the risk of debt stress as well as the 
nature of the policy response. An overly restrictive or prescriptive regulatory 
environment may limit the ability of credit providers to introduce innovative 
products or delivery channels. This in turn can undermine credit market devel-
opment and strategies to increase access to finance. Thus, the priority in early-
stage markets should be on monitoring early warning indicators and creating 
enabling infrastructure such as credit bureaux, or removing legislative obstacles 
to lending (Davel, 2013:2). 
Three theories of economic regulation will be discussed. They are welfare 
theory or public interest theory of regulation linked to Pigou (1938), contracting 
theory linked to Coase (1960) and lastly Stigler’s capture theory (1971). 
2.3.1 Public interest theory 
Public interest theory can be described as the best possible distribution of re-
sources to individuals and collective goods and services to society (Den Hertog, 
2010:5). This means that the distribution of resources by market mechanism is 
optimal (Den Hertog, 2010:3). The public interest theory of regulation is sup-
ported by two assumptions (Shleifer, 2005:440). The first assumption is that 
unconstrained markets fail due to problems of monopoly or externalities and 
secondly, governments are kind and competent to rectify these failures in 
markets through regulation (Shleifer, 2005:440). 
This theory of regulation is a guideline for what governments should do and an 
explanation of what they actually do (Shleifer, 2005:440). The government 
manages prices with the intention that natural monopolies do not charge too 
33 
much; for instance, to avoid accidents such as fires or mass poisonings, they 
put safety standards in place, regulate pathways to the employer’s monopsony 
power over employees to operate, regulate security issuances so the investors 
will not be deceived, and so forth (Shleifer, 2005:440). The government must 
ensure that the market is fair and that no discrepancy takes place. 
Public interest theory was known as the Bible of socialist and other left-leaning 
politicians and is also the basis of modern public economics that has been used 
to explain the growth of public ownership and regulation in the twentieth century 
(Shleifer, 2005:440). This theory was also criticised by people, mainly from the 
Chicago School of Law and Economics, they maintained firstly, that there 
should be no need for government intervention or regulation because markets 
and private orderings can look after the failures in the markets. Secondly, where 
there is a situation where the markets are not functioning well, the conflicts that 
market participants might have can be addressed through private litigation. 
Thirdly, regulation would make things even worse if markets and courts cannot 
solve all problems due to government regulators being incompetent, dishonest 
and captured (Shleifer, 2005:440). Effective government involvement and mar-
ket failures are vital to public interest theories, and regulation increases social 
welfare according to these theories (Den Hertog, 2010:2). 
The private interest theories of regulation are related to a number of theories in 
the field of public choice. They change into theories of political actions, depend-
ing on the efficiency of the political process, and social welfare either increases 
or decreases (Den Hertog, 2010:2). The theory was soon criticised for its 
Nirwana approach, proposing that theoretically efficient institutions could be 
seen to efficiently replace or adjust inefficient real-world institutions (Den 
Hertog, 2010:5). This led to the development of a more serious public interest 
theory of regulation, which has been variously referred to as the New Haven or 
progressive school of law and economics (Den Hertog, 2010:5). The transaction 
costs and information costs of regulation were assumed to be zero in the ori-
ginal theory and by calculating these costs, better public interest theories de-
veloped (Den Hertog, 2010:5). 
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2.3.2 Contracting theory 
According to Coase’s (1960) contracting theory as cited in Shleifer (2005:441), 
the courts are relied upon to enforce contracts and common law rules for torts 
where competition and private orderings have not succeeded in addressing 
market failures. It involves the assumption of the absence of freely available 
processed information in the political process and transaction costs (Den 
Hertog, 1999:235). In the case of faulty information, political entrepreneurs can 
identify the causes of market failure and report them to those involved (Den 
Hertog, 1999:235). When transaction costs are present, then regulation can 
form a more effective solution to market failure than private negotiations be-
tween the parties involved (Den Hertog, 1999:235). Torts are often pointed out 
by advocates of libertarian and laissez-faire viewpoints and leading economists 
as another way to countervail market forces that may hurt consumers, workers 
and the public interest (Etzioni, 2009:322). Those hurt by corporations, they 
argue, can charge them for damages, punishing and thus effectively preventing 
bad behaviour without recourse to government regulations (Etzioni, 2009:322). 
Supporters of this view ignore the fact that torts themselves reflect the law, and 
in this sense are regulated (Etzioni, 2009:322). 
2.3.3 Capture theory 
In the 1950s and 1960s early versions of capture theory were advanced by 
political scientists, whose studies of the life cycle of regulatory agencies con-
tested the classic public interest theory of regulation and its assumption of a 
caring regulator (Etzioni, 2009:319). Traditional regulatory capture theory as-
sumes that regulators understand the markets they regulate and if they did not 
understand the markets, they would not be able to identify the slack and exploit 
it (Weber, 2012:657). Political scientists developed capture theory mainly after 
public interest theory failed through empirical and theoretical research (Den 
Hertog, 2010:22). 
Capture theory is applied in regulatory agencies when private actors, seeking to 
reduce the cost of compliance, persuade regulators to adjust rules or be lenient 
in enforcing those rules (Davis, Soule & Thomas, 2010:448). The relationship is 
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not unfair, since agencies have independent power to manage their political 
constituencies (Davis et al., 2010:448). Another line of research reasons that 
capture is more likely to occur when professional norms and beliefs in an 
agency fail to counter industry influence, yet norms and beliefs offer a counter-
weight only if they deviate from regulated industries (Davis et al., 2010:448). 
Capture is more likely to happen when a public agency regulates one or few 
industries and its professional norms and beliefs are in line with the industry or 
industries (Davis et al., 2010:449). 
Capture theory questioned the assumptions of a kind and capable government 
and this is the core of Stigler’s theory. In 1971, Stigler developed a positive 
model of regulatory behaviour built on the proposal that regulators will not serve 
a single social interest, but rather their own and are motivated by political pres-
sure for redeployment (Blank & Mayo 2009:235). Capture theory is made up of 
two basic propositions. Firstly, is the political process of regulation captured by 
the industry? Regulation is used to maintain state intervention, because it fails 
to counter monopoly prices (Shleifer, 2005:441). Secondly, regulators try to 
promote social welfare, under the influence of organised consumer groups; they 
seldom succeed and are regarded as incompetent (Shleifer, 2005:441). 
This theory is disappointing in a number of ways (Den Hertog, 2010:22). Firstly, 
there is an inefficient distinction from public interest theory, because capture 
theory assumes that the public interest underlies the start of regulation (Den 
Hertog, 2010:22). Secondly, it is not certain why an industry succeeds in sub-
jecting an agency to its interests, but cannot stop it from coming into existence 
(Den Hertog, 2010:22). Thirdly, regulation often appears to attend to the inter-
ests of groups of consumers instead of the interests of the industry (Den 
Hertog, 2010:22). Fourthly, extensive regulation, such as environmental regu-
lation, regulation of product safety and labour conditions, is opposed by com-
panies because of the negative effect on profitability (Den Hertog, 2010:22). In 
conclusion, capture theory is more of a hypothesis that lacks theoretical foun-
dation and it does not explain why an industry is able to take over a regulatory 
agency and why, for instance, consumer groups fail to prevent this take-over 
(Den Hertog, 2010:22). 
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2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter covered mortgage lending and theories of regulation. In this chap-
ter mortgage lending was discussed in detail. It emphasised the importance of 
housing and the role that banks played in financing houses. This was followed 
by the conceptual framework of the theories of regulation and how credit was 
regulated. In the next chapter a discussion of the international practices on 
regulation of mortgage lending will follow. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES ON  
REGULATION OF MORTGAGE LENDING 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter international practices on the regulation of mortgage lending are 
discussed. The chapter begins with the aims of the NCA and the role of the 
National Credit Regulator (NCR) in section 3.2. In section 3.3 the interest rate 
caps will be discussed, followed by consumer protection through education in 
section 3.4. The effect of the NCA on commercial lending institutions follows in 
section 3.5 and the South African model will be considered as an example for 
Africa in section 3.6. The three types of regulation and international credit regu-
lations around the world are examined in section 3.7, followed by an exploration 
of the sub-prime crisis in the USA. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
the Basel Accord in section 3.8. 
3.2 THE AIMS OF THE NCA AND THE ROLE OF THE NCR 
Although the NCA was approved in March 2005, it was only implemented in 
June 2007. The NCA applies to credit cards, instalment agreements, overdrafts, 
leases, mortgages and micro-loans (Chipeta & Mbululu, 2012:216). 
At the end of June 2011, the credit industry in South Africa was worth more than 
R1 trillion (Stander, 2012:9). This is why it is so important that this industry be 
properly regulated to protect consumers against exploitation and irresponsible 
credit transactions, but also to protect the rights of the lenders to ensure a 
feasible credit industry (Stander, 2012:9). The purpose of the NCA is (Whittaker, 
2008:561): 
“to promote a credit market that is fair, transparent, accessible and respon-
sible. It also aims to promote a market that is competitive and sustainable. It 
specifically prohibits practices such as reckless lending and automatic increases 
in credit limits, and regulates interest and fees.” 
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This means that NCA must ensure a fair and responsible credit market and to 
prevent irresponsible lending. 
The government of South Africa introduced various financial regulations which 
include the NCA, whose aim is to provide consumer protection and to support 
the development of an accessible credit market (Otto, 2006:6). The National 
Credit Regulator (NCR) was instituted by the NCA to regulate the South African 
credit industry. It is tasked with carrying out education, research, policy develop-
ment, registration of industry participants, investigation of complaints and en-
forcing the NCA. Furthermore, the NCR is also tasked with the registration of 
credit providers, credit bureaux and debt counsellors, and enforcement of com-
pliance with the Act. 
The NCA promotes responsible borrowing, discourages reckless credit granting 
by credit providers and regulates consumer contractual default (Boraine & Van 
Heerden, 2010:2). Chipeta and Mbululu (2012:216) explain that the NCR was 
implemented to address the issue of high levels of indebtedness and to ensure 
that bank-lending procedures are clear and completely understood by the con-
sumer. Some of the regulatory measures enforced by the NCR in terms of the 
NCA are elaborated on below. 
According to Pillay (2009:14), the NCR is the authoritative supervisory body of 
the NCA and educates and creates awareness of the protection which the Act 
gives to consumers. Its mandate involves the registration of credit providers and 
monitoring of socio-economic patterns of consumer credit (Heymans & FinMark 
Trust 2010:9). The NCR collects data from registered credit providers and credit 
bureaux through various statutory returns (Heymans & FinMark Trust 2010:9). 
The NCR gives advice to the government on policy and legislation and it also 
functions as an official body which receives and investigates complaints, en-
forces the Act and takes action against any contravening institutions (Pillay, 
2009:14). 
The NCA places the following responsibility on the NCR: 
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To promote and support the development, where the need exists, of a fair, 
transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and acces-
sible credit market and industry to serve the needs of: 
i) historically disadvantaged persons; 
ii) low-income persons and communities; 
iii) remote, isolated or low density populations and communities 
in a manner consistent with the purposes of this Act (Government Gazette 
2006). The NCA regulates the granting of credit through the NCR, which assists 
in the role of a National Consumer Tribunal and as a debt counselling service 
(Chipeta and Mbululu, 2012:216). To summarise, the NCR must ensure that the 
credit market is fair, transparent and accessible to the various stakeholders. 
3.3 INTEREST RATE CAPS 
Maximum interest rates must be set by the DTI under the Act. The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, after consulting with the NCR, sets different maximum 
interest rates, as well as other non-interest costs of credit for the different types 
of credit agreements (Kelly-Louw, 2010:35). A high interest rate is one of the 
main reasons why consumers, especially low-income groups, lose their homes 
(Kelly-Louw, 2010:35). According to Mould (2008:111), the credit market is 
described as dysfunctional, underserving historically disadvantaged groups and 
characterised by insufficient transparency, lack of efficient competition and high 
cost of credit. 
There is currently no protection in the Act for a consumer against various in-
creases in the interest rate pertinent to their credit agreement as long as the 
rate falls within the range of the prescribed maximums (Kelly-Louw, 2010:33). 
Prior to the enactment of the NCA, interest rate ceilings were set by politicians 
or judges. Under the NCA the Minister of Trade and Industry must consult with 
the NCR before setting the caps for the sub-sectors (Whittaker, 2008:561). Even 
though the maximum interest rates charged by credit providers are capped, the 
rates which are not capped and which often vary are all still linked to the 
Reserve Bank repurchase rate (Kelly-Louw, 2010:33). Commercial banks use 
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this repurchase rate to establish their prime rate, which is a little more than the 
repurchase rate, allowing banks to make a profit (Kelly-Louw, 2010:33). The dif-
ference between the Reserve Bank repurchase rate and the prime lending rate 
of the commercial banks is currently 6.75% (South African Reserve Bank 2016). 
3.4 CONSUMER PROTECTION THROUGH EDUCATION 
The NCA tries to improve consumer protection within the credit market, through 
enforcement and consumer education (Whittaker, 2008:561). It also tries to 
protect consumers against reckless lending and over-indebtedness. The Usury 
Act of 1968 and the Usury Law Exemption Act of 1992 were not efficient in pro-
tecting consumers. The NCA requires the regulator to investigate complaints, as 
well as to educate consumers about their rights under the law (Whittaker, 
2008:561). Mould (2008:119) explains that the drafting of a contract between a 
consumer and a lender must be in plain language, which means that the lan-
guage must be understandable to both parties and should be clear. There must 
not be any confusion about the meaning of the contract to the parties. This will 
add to consumer protection. 
Section 63 of the NCA states that a consumer has the right to receive any 
document in terms of this Act in an official language that the consumer reads or 
understands (Mould, 2008:115). This is supported by Rencke (2011:9) that con-
sumers have the right to receive any document that is needed in terms of the 
Act in an official language that they read or understand and the information 
must be in plain and understandable language. It is fair to presume that when 
the consumer signs the credit agreement in the case of home loans, provided 
that the necessary information was supplied by the credit provider, the agreement 
is understood by the consumer (Mould, 2008:115). Consumer education can be 
a particularly helpful strategy in relation to the marketing of complex services 
and in the setting of particular groups of consumers (Pieterse, 2009:73). A lot of 
educational initiatives have been aimed at young people in formal education 
environments in the UK (Pieterse, 2009:73). 
The credit provider must give a quotation and a statement when the credit 
agreement is concluded. The reason for the quotation is for the consumer to 
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compare it with quotations from other credit providers in order to get a better 
deal (Mould, 2008:115). Section 92 of the NCA lays the responsibility on the 
credit provider to supply the necessary details of the pre-agreement disclosures 
to the consumer when they go into a credit agreement (Mould, 2008:115). 
These details include the amount of the credit provided, the instalments made, 
interest rate, the initiation fee, deposit needed, credit insurance and the service 
fee available (Mould, 2008:115). 
The purpose of the Act is to ensure that the credit provider informs the con-
sumer what is expected of them when they enter the agreement. For example, 
the consumer who applied at the financial institution for a loan to buy a home is 
informed, but the conveyancer is responsible for registering the subsequent 
bond in the Deeds Office and not the financial institution (Mould, 2008:115). 
This is because the financial institution will have explained in detail to the 
conveyancer what the credit agreement entails and the conveyancer must also 
explain to the consumer what is expected of them in terms of the agreement 
(Mould, 2008:115). When the consumer understands the details of the agree-
ment and signs it, a valid contract is created. 
3.5 EFFECT OF NCA ON OPERATIONS OF COMMERCIAL 
LENDING INSTITUTIONS 
The NCA aims to regulate all types of consumer credit and the whole range of 
formal sector credit providers, from retailers to micro-lenders to banks (Whittaker, 
2008:561). With proper preparation, lending institutions will not have problems 
with the NCA because the NCA requires credit providers to provide the pre-
agreement disclosures in order to inform the consumers exactly what they are 
entering into, adding to consensus at the eventual finalisation of the credit 
agreement (Mould, 2008:116). Credit information plays an important role when 
considering the creditworthiness of borrowers in deciding the cost of credit and 
making sure that borrowers are not over-indebted (Mtimkulu, 2009:1). 
Prior to the NCA, the criteria for banks to extend loans were based on the 
consumer’s debt repayments not exceeding 30% of their gross salary and did 
not take into account the consumer’s other debt obligations (Mlandu, 2007:67). 
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Lenders are now forced by the Act to assess the consumer’s needs holistically, 
by checking their salary slips other debts and information from credit bureaux 
on their past repayment and patterns (Mlandu, 2007:67). According to the NCR 
(2007:1), credit providers must check a consumer’s credit record from the credit 
bureaux before approving an application for credit. Credit providers are ex-
pected to provide a quotation to the credit consumer, stipulating the complete 
details. The quotation is valid for five days, which gives the consumer sufficient 
time to obtain quotations from competitors (Chipeta & Mbululu, 2012:217). The 
consumer must give complete and correct details of their debt position; failure to 
do so gives the provider the right to sue the consumer and vice versa (Chipeta 
& Mbululu, 2012:216). 
The NCA has had a positive impact on South Africa. It has granted the con-
sumers of South Africa more accessible credit, reasonable rates in some cases 
and protection against unacceptable lending practices (Luttig, 2010:59). Accord-
ing to Hetisani from the NCR, the credit landscape shows that there are 19.97 
million credit-active consumers, 53% (10.62 million) of whom were in good 
standing by the end of December 2012 (NCR, 2013:7). However, this means 
that 46.8% are not in good standing, or as it is referred to in the industry, have 
impaired records (NCR, 2013:7). The percentage share of mortgages granted, 
against total credit granted, decreased from 51.8% in December 2007 to 23.9% 
in December 2012, while over the same period unsecured credit increased from 
7.8% to 24.4% (NCR, 2013:7). 
The NCR, in the execution of its duties, removed some reckless lenders from 
the industry and did a lot to protect consumers from being exploited outside the 
workings of the Act (Luttig, 2010:59). PricewaterhouseCoopers reported in 
August 2007 that weeks after the NCA came into effect, South African banks’ 
estimated revenue grew between 10% and 30%, while income growth was 
expected to rise to 25% for the next three years (Whittaker, 2008:561). To get a 
home loan approved now by the banks is more difficult than it was in the past 
(Pillay, 2009:2). South Africa's largest bond originator OOBA (previously 
MortgageSA), which generates around 75% of all residential bond applications, 
stated in the Realestateweb article New house price index: prices falling fast, 6 
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August 2008, that the average home loan decline ratio increased from 39.9% 
(July 2007) to 51.1% (July 2008) (Pillay, 2009:2). First-time homebuyers found it 
difficult after banks implemented the NCA (Pillay, 2009:2). OOBA says that the 
average price of a property bought by first-time buyers declined by 9.1% from 
R548 784 (July 2007) to R498 570 (July 2008), reflecting that first-time home-
buyers were deciding on smaller, more affordable homes (Pillay, 2009:2). 
Banks that reacted early to the Act’s new provisions gained competitive ad-
vantage over their competitors that were not so quick to implement these 
changes (Pieterse, 2009:54). Capitec Bank Holdings is one of the banks that 
reacted early to these changes and used technology to keep its costs to a mini-
mum. It extended its micro-lending services to 336 000 new clients from August 
2006 to August 2007. 
The impact of the NCA was also negative. In spite of the improved lending 
environment, SA consumers were not able to improve their credit standing as 
more and more credit-active consumers started skipping payments (Luttig, 
2010:59). Even though consumers want a better standard of living, lenders 
submit to the demand for more credit and continue to price their loan products 
for the risk associated with the consumer group applying, putting many lenders 
who borrow to pay other debt in a continuously worse position, making it almost 
impossible for consumers to escape from the debt trap (Luttig, 2010:60). The 
steady decline in the number of residential developments along with the parallel 
implementation of the NCA has affected the residential property market para-
doxically (Pillay, 2009:2). Data issued by StatsSA on residential buildings com-
pleted reveals that there was a slowdown in the number of residential develop-
ments completed over the period 2007 to 2008 (Pillay, 2009:2). The NCA also 
had a negative impact on the supply and delivery of housing, due to the large 
housing backlog in South Africa (Pillay, 2009:3). In his meeting with housing 
MECs from all nine provinces on 25 May 2009, Tokyo Sexwale, then Minister of 
Human Settlements, indicated that South Africa had a housing backlog of 2.2 
million houses (Pillay, 2009:3). Although the NCA has had some positive re-
sults, it is still to be seen what will happen in the long term. 
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3.6 THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL AS AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL 
OF AFRICA 
Similar legislation to the NCA was promulgated in other countries. As other 
countries look to reform their lending practices, they should pay close attention 
to SA’s consumer protection efforts, says Patricia McCoy, a law professor at the 
University of Connecticut (Chu, 2009). The challenge, she notes, is how to en-
act similar reforms in countries such as the US, where providing people with 
choices that forced disclosure, rather than regulation, has long been the norm 
(Chu, 2009). According to Chu (2009), the NCA offers stronger protection for 
credit cards, overdrafts and other consumer loans than most developed coun-
tries, including the USA. The NCA has been influenced by Canada, Australia 
and British historical behaviour concerning reckless lending and over-indebted-
ness (Rossouw, 2008:105). The foundation of the NCA was built on Canadian 
law to ensure that consumers are protected against reckless lending and over-
indebtedness (Rossouw, 2008:105). 
The NCA is seen as worthy of analysing because of the occurrence of micro-
finance in the country (Whittaker, 2008:561). There has been a change in the 
parallel banking system of the mid-1990s, which included a bank for the poor 
and one for the better-off. Countries such as Kenya and Tanzania are under-
going institutional changes in entering the formal financial sector (Whittaker, 
2008:561). Kenya uses two national newspapers, the Union and the Standard, 
to advertise their 42 branches and publish their fees and bank costs. Rashid 
Ahmed of the Microfinance Regulatory Commission (MFRC) (Whittaker, 2008: 
578) states that: 
“micro-finance in most African countries is still regarded as separate from the 
formal financial sector and handled as such. Until an energetic and determined 
effort is made to integrate micro-finance into the formal banking systems, we’ll 
always be playing catch-up.” 
This means that micro-finance must be part of formal banking in African coun-
tries. 
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3.6.1 Africa 
Makina (2012:410) has examined whether housing finance differs for each 
country in terms of sources including funds, mortgage products and the role of 
the government, and observes that for most African countries housing finance is 
dominated by state-owned specialised banks. These banks depend on govern-
ment for direct lending, which plays a key role in fixing the interest rates and 
providing funds and guarantees (Makina, 2012:410). Households in Africa cling 
to housing as the best form of saving and it has been found that inflation-ad-
justed yields on housing are higher than those of financial savings, for example 
pension, provident funds and bank deposits (Okpala, 2012:182). Generally, the 
rapid growth in the urban population in Africa has not been matched by in-
creases in sufficient housing for the population, but rather has resulted in a 
shortage of decent and reasonable urban housing (Okpala, 2012:182). 
According to Erbas and Nothaft (2005:215), in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MEANA) region, mortgage financing is difficult and inadequately distributed for 
low- and middle-income groups. The reasons for this are the following: Firstly, 
the low-income group is unable to afford a minimum deposit. Secondly, lenders 
see this household group as a poor credit risk. Lastly, private mortgage markets 
cannot gain access to affordable mortgages due to market failures. Mortgage 
market failure in providing financing for some households reflects high informa-
tion costs to assess and differentiate credit risk and leads to adverse selection 
and credit rationing in favour of high-income households by the existing 
mortgage lending institutions (Erbas & Nothaft, 2005:215). In many developing 
countries, as well as those in the MEANA region, there is a lack of low- and 
middle-income housing, but a large supply of high-income housing (Erbas & 
Nothaft, 2005:215). 
3.6.2 Nigeria 
In 1992, the National Housing Forum (NHF) was established with the objective 
of assisting Nigerians in obtaining houses at affordable prices, ensuring a con-
stant supply of loans, and offering long-term loans to mortgage institutions for 
on-lending to sponsors (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). New legislation has been de-
signed for the NHF, which could partially overcome the shortcomings of the 
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system in two key aspects (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). Firstly, the fund would be 
given the structure of a trust and managed by a board of trustees bound to 
stronger accountability obligations than now (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). Lastly, the 
relationship between contributors and borrowers would be changed, possibly 
restraining the reverse subsidisation mechanism: the wage level above which 
salaried workers would have to contribute would increase to seven times the 
minimum wage, and the NHF would be allowed to lend to non-contributing, low-
income households (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). Interest rates by the law would be 
set beneath the market level for both savings and lending, giving new legal 
comfort to a still potentially regressive subsidisation scheme (Chiquier & Lea, 
2009). 
3.7 CREDIT REGULATION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
OUTSIDE AFRICA 
3.7.1 Pillars of credit regulation 
There are three types of regulation to protect credit customers in selected coun-
tries (France, Germany, Switzerland, UK, US and SA) within their developed 
financial sectors and each is included in the NCA (Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-
Louw 2006:19–22) (see Table 3.1). They are also described as the three pillars. 
 The first pillar – Lenders may be required to keep within the limits of the 
client’s credit redemption capacities. This pillar is implemented by the Swiss 
Bundesgesetz uber den Konsumentenkredit. This is the federal law for 
consumer credit, which does not apply to secured credit. It states that the 
maximum share of the attachable income has to be assessed by checking 
the consumer’s borrowing capacity and their attachable income has to be 
sufficient to pay back the consumer credit (or if the customer has several 
consumer loans, all loans) within 36 months. 
The NCA requires the lender to, inter alia, assess the client’s ability to pay. 
It also requires the client to provide full financial information to prevent 
reckless credit (see sections 80–84 of the NCA). 
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 The second pillar – Lenders are obliged to disclose fully all costs of credit 
arrangements before a client signs a contract. This pillar is implemented by 
the EU and the US. Directives 87/102/EC and 98/7/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council introduced a specified method of calculating 
the so-called annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) and this method 
states the equivalence of loans on the one hand and repayments and 
charges on the other. 
Furthermore, any advertisement or offer displayed on the business prem-
ises in which credit or the arrangement of a credit agreement is offered and 
which includes a rate of interest or any figures relating to the cost of the 
credit must also include a statement of the APRC. 
In the USA the annual percentage rate (APR) is defined by the Federal 
Truth and Lending Law and can be calculated either by the actuarial method 
or the United States Rule method. Regardless of which method is applied, 
discount points, origination points, prepaid interest, loan processing fee, 
underwriting fee, document preparation fee and private mortgage insurance 
are included. 
The NCA requires comprehensive disclosure of all interest and other fees 
and charges payable on the principal debt in a percentage and rand value, 
together with a repayment schedule in the form of a pre-agreement state-
ment and quotation so that the client has time to think about it before com-
mitting to the loan (see section 92 of the Act, read with regulations 28 and 
29). 
Furthermore, the NCA and Regulations have stringent disclosure provisions 
which, depending on the type of advertisement, must be complied with. For 
example, when credit providers advertise specific credit products, offer a 
specific amount of credit to a consumer, or offer to render services on 
credit, the following information must be disclosed: the instalment amount, 
number of instalments, total amount of all instalments (including interest, 
fees and insurance), residual or final amount payable and the interest rate 
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and other credit costs (see section 76 of the NCA read with regulations 21 
and 22). 
 The third pillar – Caps may be put on the pricing of consumer credit or 
usury laws may determine that pricing. This pillar is found in Switzerland, 
France and some of the states in the USA. In Switzerland, for example, the 
cap is set by the Bundesrat (Federal Council). The interest rates that banks 
have to pay for refinancing have to be considered, but the cap should nor-
mally stay below 15% per annum. 
In France, the usury rule is set by Article L.313-3 of the Code de la 
Consommation (Consumer Code). It states that a loan is usurious if it is 
granted at a rate that exceeds, at the time it is granted, the average ef-
fective rate applied during the prior quarter of the year by credit institutions 
for loans of the same nature with identical risk, as defined by the relevant 
administrative authority after consulting the NCC, by more than a third. 
Goodwin-Groen and Kelly-Louw (2006) further explain that some states in 
the USA have interest rate ceilings as well. The State of New York set this 
rate at 16% per annum by section 5–501 of the General Obligations Law. 
Another approach to interest rate caps is used in Germany and the UK. In 
these countries there are no definite caps, but usury (exorbitant) interest 
rates are forbidden by law. Normally these usury interest rates are penalised 
in Germany by court if the APR is twice as high as the prevailing normal 
rate, and if the loan furthermore has been fixed by abuse of an exigency, 
inexperience, of lack of judgment or substantial weak will, but even here 
there is scope for clarification (Goodwin-Groen & Kelly-Louw, 2006:22). The 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, after consulting with the NCR, sets different 
maximum interest rates, as well as other non-interest costs of credit for the 
different types of credit agreements (Kelly-Louw, 2010:35). 
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Table 3.1: Consumer credit law in selected countries 
Country Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III 
France  APRC includes all 
costs and has to be 
published. 
A loan is stated as usury when 
the rate exceeds the average 
effective rate of the prior quarter 
(published by the Bank of 
France) by one third. 
Germany  APRC includes all 
costs and has to be 
published. 
If the APR is double the market 
interest rate and there has 
been abuse of an exigency, in-
experience, lack of judgment or 
substantial weak will, the inter-
est rate is illegal according to 
court orders. 
Switzerland Attachable 
income has to 
be high enough 
to pay back the 
credit within 36 
months. 
APRC includes all 
costs. 
Interest cap usually fixed below 
15% per annum. 
United 
Kingdom 
 APR includes all 
costs and has to be 
published. 
Usurious credit agreements 
can be reopened by court. 
United 
States 
 APRC includes all 
costs according to 
the Federal Truth 
and Lending Law. 
Different regulations in every 
state. 
South Africa National Credit 
Act requires 
lender to 
assess the 
client’s ability 
to pay. 
All costs must be 
disclosed in terms 
of the National 
Credit Act and 
Regulations. 
Regulations provide for maxi-
mum rates of interest appli-
cable to seven different types 
of credit. 
Source:  Goodwin-Groen and Kelly-Louw (2006:23) 
All housing finance institutions in each country are regulated under one or more 
pieces of national legislation and institutions are obliged to adhere to other 
countries’ regulations for the purpose either of lending or raising funds (Flanagan, 
2012:508). Regulation is generally defined as a set of enforceable rules that 
limit or direct the actions of market participants and as a result modify the ou-
tcomes of these actions (Davids, 2008:17). Therefore the market itself, without 
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the interference of government or involvement of other external forces, may 
perform regulation (Davids, 2008:17). 
3.7.2 Credit regulation in selected countries 
3.7.2.1 China 
The world's largest public credit register is in China. The Credit Registry Center 
of the People's Bank of China registered more than 600 million consumers in 
March 2008, 110 million of whom had an established credit relationship with a 
bank or other financial institution (Jentzsch, 2008:537). The database on cor-
porations registered more than 13 million companies in 2007, 5.9 million of 
which had an established credit relationship. This registry was expected to have 
a significant impact on the economic life of the citizens of China, but also on 
banking competition, credit market development and banking performance 
(Jentzsch, 2008:537). The registry is outstanding for several reasons: its sheer 
size, the volumes of daily inquiries and the underlying ‘social credit’ approach, 
which includes bank and non-bank information on individuals and companies 
(Jentzsch, 2008:537). 
The residential mortgage is a new and growing sector of the Chinese capital 
market and over the last decade, it has become a financial mechanism for 
flourishing residential housing development and economic growth in China 
(Deng & Fei, 2012:422). In China there is no law that governs the collection and 
use of credit-related information (Mtimkulu, 2009:19). This information is mainly 
spread in government departments. China wants to address corruption where 
poor and unconnected consumers who have innovative ideas are denied ac-
cess to funds even though they have good credit records (Mtimkulu, 2009:19). 
In the 1990s, the Chinese mortgage market was developed as a by-product and 
has increased since 1998 (Deng & Fei, 2012:423). The housing system is made 
up of both the policy-driven housing finance channel and market-oriented 
housing finance channel. The Housing provident fund (HPF) was introduced in 
Shanghai in 1991 as a pilot programme and in 1995 it was extended nation-
wide, in order to start a housing finance system that could carry on the housing 
policy reform (for example, transform housing from welfare to commodity) 
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(Chiquier & Lea, 2009). HPF operations are conducted through 320 manage-
ment centres and the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Finance are 
responsible for managing the scheme at national level, while the People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC) regulates the interest rates (Chiquier & Lea, 2009). Housing 
committees at local level determine policies with the management centres and 
commercial banks are hired to handle the deposits, financial management and 
lending (Chiquier & Lea, 2009:282). 
In 1998 the PBOC released regulations for mortgage lending, fixing the lower 
limit of loans with different maturities, introducing rules on interest rates and 
opening the possibility for banks to set an interest rate above the lower rate 
(Jentzch, 2008:539). The regulations determine maturity terms and the eligibility 
of borrowers and have resulted in a rapid rise of housing finance provision 
(Jentzch, 2008:539). This has led to several adjustments of lending terms by 
the PBOC, including raising the minimum interest rate for housing loans of 5 
years or more by 0.2% from 5.51% or by requiring individuals to make a 30% 
deposit, instead of 20% in 2005 (Jentzch, 2008:539). The Euromonitor pro-
jected that in 1998 only 1.3% of households had a mortgage; this rate stood at 
12.6% in 2006 and was predicted to reach 23.4% of households in 2010 
(Jentzch, 2008:539). 
China’s commercial bank mortgage is different from US mortgage markets 
(Deng & Fei, 2012:423). Banks in China prefer a collateral system, while most 
developed countries prefer established credit rating systems (Mtimkulu, 2009: 
19). The commercial mortgage in the US market refers to collaterised lending to 
the property developers or investors (Deng & Fei, 2012:423). 
The HPF is a mandatory housing savings scheme in China and employers who 
are situated in the urban areas are obliged to contribute a certain portion of their 
salary to the savings and employees are also obliged to do the same (Deng & 
Fei, 2012:423). The HPF loan is not enough for most households to buy a 
house; currently homebuyers use both HPF funds and residential mortgage 
loans (bank loans) to buy commodity housing units from the market (Deng & 
Fei, 2012:423). 
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3.7.2.2 United Kingdom (UK) 
Western European countries, including the UK, have different housing finance 
systems which consist of a mixture of retail deposits, mortgage bonds and con-
tract systems (Flanagan, 2012:509). The regulation and control of mortgage 
lending institutions has started in the UK and is presently the responsibility of 
the Financial Service Authority (FSA) (Flanagan, 2012:509). The Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 of the UK was replaced by the Consumer Credit Act 2006. 
Factors including hire purchase agreements in 1982, followed by deregulation 
of the UK personal financial services marketplace and changes to the rules 
governing official credit allocation changed borrowing into an acceptable norm 
of consumers’ lives (Ironfield-Smith, Keasey, Summers, Duxbury & Hudson, 
2005:133). 
Inflation increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s and made buying on 
credit more preferable than saving for goods. This had a negative effect on 
saving even after inflation dropped (Ironfield-Smith et al., 2005:133). 
Thirty years after the introduction of the Consumer Credit Act there were seri-
ous concerns about the rising consumer debt in the UK (unsecured and secured 
debt totalled £1,066 bn by 31 January 2005) (Ironfield-Smith et al., 2005:133). 
Between 1994 and 2004 the UK experienced a consumer credit outburst be-
cause of the increased availability of unsecured credit and financial institutions 
that offered unsecured loans to consumers (Rossouw, 2008:25). 
A task force was appointed in October 2000 to assist consumers in using credit 
more responsibly. The 2004 Consumer Credit Act of the UK helps consumers to 
understand the correct cost of credit in a sensible and clear way, and they must 
understand this in plain and understandable language (Chipeta & Mbululu, 
2012:217). The NCA in South Africa implemented this approach so that credit 
providers reveal information in the language that the consumer is happy with 
(Chipeta & Mbululu, 2012:216). 
3.7.2.3 United States of America (USA) 
The USA does not have legislation similar to that of the UK. The deregulation of 
the USA credit industry in the late 1980s has meant that there has been no 
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single regulatory body regulating the sector (Pieterse, 2009:36). However, a 
series of Acts covers many aspects of the industry and these Acts are charged 
with regulating consumer credit in that country (Pieterse, 2009:36). Since most 
of the regulatory Acts have been applied in the USA, more attention is given to 
disclosure, privacy, anti-terrorism, anti-money laundering, fraud prevention and 
anti-usury lending, and to encouraging credit accessibility to lower income 
groups. These Acts do not apply equally to all US states because some states 
have their own consumer credit legislation (Pieterse, 2009:36). 
The US housing finance market has had an important impact on other housing 
finance markets over the last half century due to the key position the country 
has in world affairs (Flanagan, 2012:508). The vast majority of all home mort-
gage loans prior to 1980 were made by savings and loans associations, which 
originated, serviced and held the loans in their portfolios, in what is widely 
known as an originate-to-hold model (Barth, Li, Lu, Phumiwasana & Yago, 
2009:5). Home mortgages over time were increasingly securitised (i.e. put into 
pools and packaged into securities backed by the individual loans) and sold in 
the secondary market; this process is the originate-to-distribute model (Barth et 
al., 2009:5). 
The US government put a series of measures in place to regulate the mortgage 
system after the crisis of the mortgage system accompanied by the financial 
crisis of the Great Depression (Levitin & Wachter, 2012:404). Securitisation was 
made part of the 1934 National Housing Act (Saayman, 2011:1). This Act was 
created to decrease the dependence of financial institutions on core deposits, 
but it did not increase the supply of mortgage finance in the US (Saayman, 
2011:1). In 1938 the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie 
Mae) started to buy and sell federally insured mortgages in an effort to develop 
a secondary mortgage market, but still less than 5% of all new mortgages were 
sold in the secondary market in the early 1960s (Saayman, 2011:1). The Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac) started as a gov-
ernment-chartered corporation in 1970, but it turned out to be a private cor-
poration in 1989 (Saayman, 2011:1). 
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The demand for home finance grew significantly in the US throughout the 1970s 
because of baby boomers that reached home-buying ages (Saayman, 2011:1). 
Housing was funded by the thrift industry (US associations, formerly known as 
savings and loans associations), which borrowed money from depositors at 
fluctuating rates and lent this money at fixed rates to homebuyers. Questions 
were raised about the capability of the thrift system to finance the growing 
demand for mortgages (Saayman, 2011:1). The high unemployment level trig-
gered substantial numbers of foreclosures and payment failures with halving 
house prices (Flanagan, 2012:508). The US administration supported insolvent 
lending institutions through the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). In 1934 the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) was formed to support insurance against mortgage default 
under Roosevelt’s administration (Flanagan, 2012:508). The idea behind the 
FHA was that if government accepted the credit risk, then lenders would extend 
credit to the less creditworthy borrowers (Levitin & Wachter, 2012:404). The 
HOLC did short refinancing of troubled mortgages which were restructured into 
long-term, fully amortised fixed-rate loans (Levitin & Wachter, 2012:404). A 
finance system which would enable homeowners to attain fully amortising loans 
was one of President Roosevelt’s goals (Buttimer, 2011:14). 
The next major housing finance shift took place in the 1970s and 1980s due to 
oil shocks, the effects of the Vietnam War and changes in monetary policy 
which accepted money supply instead of interest rate targets (Flanagan, 2012: 
508). Congress created another government-sponsored enterprise, Freddie 
Mac, to compete with Fannie Mae (Buttimer, 2011:15). The federal charter of 
Freddie Mac is almost identical to that of Fannie Mae and the two companies 
have always been comparable in both operations and their economics (Buttimer, 
2011:15). Freddie Mac became a private corporation in 1989 (Saayman, 2011:1). 
The low interest rates from 2001 to the end of 2004 were an important contri-
buting factor to the credit boom and the record homeownership levels, as the 
Federal Reserve took steps to fight the 2001 recession and prevent deflation 
(Barth et al., 2009:7). The low interest rate environment had an effect on a lot of 
homebuyers: they increasingly chose adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) over 
fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) (Barth et al., 2009:7). ARMs held appeal for lend-
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ers, as they moved interest rate risk to the borrowers and during the housing 
boom, a lot of borrowers took that risk in exchange for the low initial payments 
that made purchasing homes more reasonable (Barth et al., 2009:7). In addition 
to funding home purchases, mortgage loans also enable borrowers to tap into 
any equity that is built up in their homes (Barth et al., 2009:7). From only about 
5% in 2001, almost 15% of all mortgage originations in 2006 and 2007 were 
home equity loans (Barth et al., 2009:7). Consumers increasingly came to view 
their homes as ready sources of credit and some borrowers were using their 
home equity to manage debt or finance lifestyles they could not pay for unless 
home prices kept increasing during the housing boom (Barth et al., 2009:7). 
Sub-prime crisis in United States of America (USA) 
The term credit crunch has been used to describe the decrease of credit supply 
in response to both (i) a decline in the value of bank capital and, (ii) conditions 
required by bank supervisors, regulators, or banks themselves that want banks 
to keep more capital than they previously would have kept (Mizen, 2008:531). 
The credit crunch had a global impact since international investors were in-
volved. For many, the financial crisis of the US started in 2007 when the 
Federal Reserve increased interest rates and the housing market suffered a 
setback and home prices dropped (Stecker, 2009:72). 
The sub-prime mortgage market gave access to credit to homeowners and 
individuals that did not qualify to take part in the conventional market (Ho & 
Pennington-Cross, 2008:176). Sub-prime mortgages were sold to borrowers 
with low credit ratings and financial institutions normally charged these borrow-
ers higher than normal risk premiums because they had to carry the risk. The 
credit crunch was linked to the sub-prime crisis in the US in 2007. 
According to Kolb (2011:38), the sub-prime crisis did not happen overnight; it 
took years and a great deal to lay the foundation for disaster. This foundation 
was associated with social indicators that were in fact quite promising and 
assisted in covering the shakiness of the towering debt of mortgage finance 
(Kolb, 2011:38). The question was why the credit crunch took place and why 
then. It was due to two developments which took place in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Firstly, the extremely tranquil macro-economic conditions (Great 
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Moderation) together with a flow of global savings from emerging and oil-ex-
porting countries resulted in reduced macro-economic volatility and lower long-
term interest rates. Secondly, an expansion of securitisation in sub-prime mort-
gage assets formed sophisticated financial assets with relatively high yields and 
good credit ratings (Mizen, 2008:533). 
Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy (2010:204) identify the factors that contributed to 
the build-up and bursting of the US housing bubble, such as the role of financial 
innovation, over-optimism about the sub-prime and other innovations, sources 
of leverage and liquidity during the sub-prime and structured finance, market 
frictions and house price expectations and the combination of bubble-feeding 
factors. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008) maintain that the USA was not the 
highest in terms of price growths, compared to Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, 
UK and New Zealand, which had higher housing prices. The US financial sys-
tem transformed sub-prime mortgages that were historically handled by local 
bankers into mortgage-backed securities with AAA ratings which were suitable 
for pension funds, insurance companies and banks around the world (Kashyap 
et al., 2008). The financial crisis hit a high pitch in the autumn of 2008 when the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt (Stecker, 2009:74). Merrill 
Lynch was acquired by Bank of America, AIG received $80 billion from the fed-
eral government and Wachovia agreed to be acquired by Wells Fargo (Stecker, 
2009:74). In the midst of all these changes, Congress issued the Emergency 
Economic Stabilisation Act of 2008 which approved the US Treasury proposal for 
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Stecker, 2009:74). 
One can realistically claim that there was a lack of regulation, but given re-
source constraints it is hard to believe that a better regulatory environment could 
have been implemented (Buttimer, 2011:26). Financial institutions must take 
risks to function and regulators must allow them to take these risks (Buttimer, 
2011:26). To guarantee no losses is to enforce regulation that stops institutions 
from taking risk, which will cause the downfall of the market for risk and a major 
decline in innovation and risk-taking in the world (Buttimer, 2011:27). Mortgage 
regulations have transformed the housing market from days of stability through 
a phase of fast-tracking competition to the uncertainty of today’s post-crisis 
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reforms; no matter what regulations are put in place, the market will operate 
differently (Levitin & Wachter, 2012:408). The government will no longer have 
sole control over interest rates as they used to have and banks are free to issue 
many types of mortgages (Levitin & Wachter, 2012:408). 
3.7.2.4 Turkey 
For a long time, the public sector funded houses in Turkey to people who 
wanted a first home, but to the banking sector it was not beneficial to provide 
funds to homeowners since the laws hindered the supply of loans in this area 
until 1979 (Akçay, 2011:23). It became more attractive to provide financing from 
1989 and banks started to work and compete with each other in the market, and 
lower rates and longer loan terms were granted to homebuyers. 
In Turkey the commercial banks control 86.1% of the financial system and they 
also control the residential credit market (Akçay, 2011:23). The share of com-
mercial banks in the Turkish mortgage market was 89.5% by the end of 2009, 
whereas the share of the Housing Development Administration (HDA) was 
10.5% (see Figure 3.1) (Akçay, 2011:23). The HDA provides loans for housing 
construction by co-operatives, private companies and municipalities and has 
been acting both as a property developer and a housing finance institution in 
the residential mortgage markets (Akçay, 2011:23). 
The consumer price index (CPI) and the rate of state sector wage increases has 
been indexed to the interest rates of the HDA mortgage credits given to builders 
(co-operative, private construction companies and municipalities) (Akçay, 2011: 
23). The principal and interest rates are adjusted twice a year (January and 
July) in Turkey, whereas the maturity changes from 5 – 11 years, depending on 
the size of the house (Akçay, 2011:23). 
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Figure 3.1:  Commercial banks and HDA in Turkey (types of institutions – 2009) 
Source:  Adapted from Akçay (2011:23) 
Houses by the HDA are sold with long financing terms (i.e. 10 – 20 years) and 
sold at beginning of the project, with the rate of state sector wage increases and 
interest rates indexed to CPI (Akçay, 2011:23). Homebuyers make a deposit of 
15 – 25% of the selling price of the house when signing the purchase contract. 
A new regulation came into effect in February 2007, which was called the Mort-
gage Law. The law was based on the following objectives (Akçay, 2011:24): 
 Creating institutions for financing mortgages; 
 Allowing mortgage financing institutions to accept residential mortgages to 
securitise the loans; 
 Allowing new types of institutions (financial leasing companies, financial 
companies) to accept residential mortgages to securitise loans. 
3.7.2.5 European Union (EU) 
The member states of the EU had until June 2010 to change the guidelines 
covered in the 2008 EU Consumer Credit Directive into their national laws and 
to repeal the former Council Directive in this regard (Rencke, 2011:3). Rencke 
(2011:3) points out that the purpose of the 2008 Directive is to harmonise 
certain aspects of the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of the 
member states regarding credit agreements. Excluding a few specific exclusions, 
the 2008 Directive applies to all credit agreements and the onus is on creditors 
to check the creditworthiness of a consumer (Rencke, 2011:3). Member states 
must make sure that creditors provide additional assistance to consumers to 
help them decide which credit agreement is the most suitable for their financial 
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situation and needs (Rencke, 2011:4). The relevant pre-contractual information 
and the essential characteristics of the products proposed should be explained 
to the consumer in a personalised manner so that the consumer does not 
misinterpret the effects which it may have on their economic situation (Rencke, 
2011:4). 
The importance of residential mortgage debts in the EU increased due to the 
liberalisation efforts made in the financial markets and the decreasing interest 
rates over the last 10 years (see Table 3.2) (Akçay, 2011:25). At end of 1999, 
the mortgage debt was €3.1 trillion and increased to €6.1 trillion by the end of 
2009. There was an increase in mortgage debt to GDP ratio from 35.6% to 
51.9% in 1999 (Akçay, 2011:25). The growth of the mortgage debt was due to 
the sharp decline in GDP in 2009 (4.2%), which was set off by the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the US (Akçay, 2011:25). The increase in the total mortgage 
debt imitates the credit dynamics, supported by the decreasing interest rates 
around the eurozone, to a greater extent, after the use of a single monetary 
policy (Akçay, 2011:26). 
There is no single European mortgage market, and each market is trained by 
national rules and regulations as well as by a set of shared ideas about the 
mortgage market (Aalbers, 2012:400). There is an external dynamic which is 
shaped by both state and non-state regulation and also by international market 
developments (Aalbers, 2009:399). Initiatives to open markets and the global 
spread of risk management policies such as credit scoring prepared by ICT 
devices and applications are all examples of regulation (Aalbers, 2009:399). 
The Basel II Accord identified the internal rating based method as the new 
system for measuring solvency from 2007 and it means that providers who 
apply credit risk management will achieve higher solvency scores from the 
National or European Central Bank than providers who do not, and they will 
then need less equity (Aalbers, 2009:400). 
There are two credit information system modes in developed countries: the 
American mode in which the credit databases are invested and led by govern-
ment-funded organisations (Mtimkulu, 2009:22), and the mode followed in many 
Western European countries, where the responsibility of setting up public credit 
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databases is led by the central bank or the bank union (Mtimkulu, 2009:22). 
According to Mtimkulu (2009:22), governments in European countries intervene 
through the regulation of credit reporting activities under the data protection 
laws that cover Credit bureaux (CB) activities, and all transactions associated 
with the management of data and sharing of information. 
Various funding techniques are used in the mortgage markets of the EU mem-
ber countries and these techniques differ from country to country. Savings 
deposits (53%) are the most commonly used, 39% of the mortgage credit is 
funded through capital markets and almost 23% of this is achieved through the 
issue of mortgage bonds and the rest (16%) through the issue of mortgage-
backed securities (MBSs) (Figure 3.2) (Akçay, 2011:27). The mortgage debt total 
has grown threefold in the last 10 years in the EU and the growth rate loan has 
been higher than the growth rate of the GDP (Akçay, 2011:27). The driving 
factors of this strong growth rate have been the procedures carried out to cul-
minate in a single currency since the beginning of the 1990s to meet the needs 
of the adjustment to financial liberalisation and the dropping of interest rates 
(Akçay, 2011:27). This has led to more rivalry in the housing markets and has 
caused the increase in the homebuyers’ affordability and resulted in a rising 
demand for mortgage loans (Akçay, 2011:27). To create one mortgage market 
is a dream because the European financial landscape will remain one of differ-
ent national mortgage markets that are similar to each other (Aalbers, 2012:400). 
 
Figure 3.2:  Funding resources in the EU (2009) 
Source:  Adapted Akçay from (2011:23) 
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Table 3.2: Residential mortgage markets in the EU (2009) 
Country 
Value of mortgage debt  
(£ million) 
Residential debt to  
GDP ratio (%) 
Australia 72.487 26.2 
Belgium 146.329 43.3 
Denmark 231.263 103.8 
France 737.600 0.4 
Finland 71.860 0.6 
Germany 1 146.969 47.6 
Greece 80.559 33.9 
Ireland 147.654 90.3 
Italy 330.585 21.7 
Luxembourg 15.842 0.4 
Netherlands 602.192 105.6 
Portugal 110.685 0.7 
Spain 678.872 64.6 
Sweden 236.062 0.8 
UK 1 372.659 87.6 
New members 
Bulgaria 4.268 12.6 
Czech Republic 16.975 19.4 
Estonia 6.111 44.5 
Hungary 15.543 16.7 
Latvia 6.866 36.6 
Lithuania 6.032 22.2 
Malta 2.458 0.4 
Poland 56.569 18.2 
Romania 5.700 4.9 
Slovakia 9.226 14.6 
South Cyprus 3 61.3 
EU-27 6 125.727 51.9 
Turkey 19.386 4.6 
Source:  Adapted from Akçay (2011:25) 
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3.8 AN OVERVIEW OF THE BASEL ACCORDS 
The Basel Accords are some of the most powerful and misinterpreted agree-
ments in international finance (Balin, 2008:1). Basel II comprises minimum capi-
tal requirements and a supervisory review process. Basel I and II were drafted 
in 1988 and 2004, respectively, and lead in a new area of international banking 
co-operation (Balin, 2008:1). 
3.8.1 Basel II 
Due to the banking crisis of the 1990s and the criticisms against Basel I, the 
Basel Committee suggested a new, more comprehensive capital adequacy ac-
cord in 1999 (Balin, 2008:6). Basel II is an extension of Basel I and includes 
factors such as market and operational risk, market-based discipline and sur-
veillance, and regulatory mandates (Balin, 2008:6). The pillar framework of 
Basel I was kept, it was simply extended under Basel II. Basel II stipulates the 
internal rating based method as the new system for measuring solvency from 
2007, which means that providers will receive higher solvency from the National 
or European Central Bank if they apply for credit risk management than pro-
viders who do not, and therefore less equity is necessary (Aalbers, 2012:400). 
The use of credit risk management techniques is an example of the globalisa-
tion of financial regulation because it encourages more actors to apply similar 
methods in the credit market (Aalbers, 2012:400). The Basel Accords are tightly 
connected to the global spread and institutionalisation of credit risk manage-
ment (Aalbers, 2012:400). Basel I lowered the capital adequacy risk weights for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac MBSs to 20%, while allowing leverage to increase 
from 2 to 5 times, making mortgages very profitable and stable long-term invest-
ments (Flanagan, 2012:508). According to Calem and Follain (2007:199), Basel 
II significantly cuts down the regulatory capital requirements for residential mort-
gages with relatively small amounts of risk. 
3.8.2 Basel III 
Banks that worry about potential fair lending claims should also worry about the 
new proposed bank capital rules if they reject granting residential mortgage 
loans that are not qualified residential mortgage loans (Platt, Ragalevsky & 
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Mahoney, 2012:1). On 7 June 2012 the Federal Reserve approved for public-
cation three sets of proposed regulations to review the risk-based capital rules 
for banks to make them consistent with the new international capital standard, 
commonly known as Basel III, and certain requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(Platt et al., 2012:1). Basel III can be described as a comprehensive set of 
reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the 
banking sector (Van Dyk, 2011:2). Basel III requires banks to hold additional 
minimum capital and addresses liquidity concerns. It introduces many changes 
that affect most aspects of banks' balance sheets (Healey, 2013:66). Conserva-
tive residential mortgage loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios in surplus of 80%, 
irrespective of the presence of private mortgage insurance, could activate 
adverse capital requirements if the loans are held for investment and do not 
fulfil certain regulatory underwriting criteria (Platt et al., 2012:1). Under the 
implementation of Basel III these loans could run the legal risk of loss under the 
ability to repay rules, the credit risk of loss under the risk retention rules and 
currently increased capital charges (Platt et al., 2012:1). 
Banks had increased their capital ratios relative to the pre-crisis levels as a 
result of significant market pressures, prior to the new Basel III (Slovik & 
Cournède, 2011:5). The US banks, the eurozone and Japan increased their 
common equity ratio on average by 1.3 percentage points and their Tier 1 
capital ratio on average by 1.5 percentage points by the end of 2009 (Slovik & 
Cournède, 2011:5). Effective as of 2015, banks increased their lending spreads 
on average by approximately 15 basis points in order to meet the Basel III re-
quirements and on average by approximately 50 basis points effective as of 
2019 (Slovik & Cournède, 2011:8). 
Although the recession caused by the crisis has technically ended, the regu-
latory reaction has now started (Paskelian & Bell, 2013:8). The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform in the US and the Consumer Protection Act (2010) were 
approved to curb and prevent the financial and regulatory weaknesses that 
have been accused of triggering the 2008 crisis (Paskelian & Bell 2013:8). The 
Dodd-Frank Act (2010) was created to address problems and areas of need in 
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the regulatory framework governing US financial institutions (Paskelian & Bell, 
2013:8). The Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision updated its frame-
work and regards Basel III as a global regulatory standard on bank capital ade-
quacy, market liquidity risk and stress testing (Paskelian & Bell, 2013:8). 
According to Healey (2013:67), Basel III will have a negative impact on the 
financial dynamics of mortgage servicing rights, since the capital needed can 
easily make or exceed 30% versus 8% for most loans. From the viewpoint of 
bank-owned mortgage bankers, however, the final outcome is a partial win for 
mortgage lenders and a loss for mortgage servicers (Healey, 2013:66). There 
had been continued deregulation of financial markets and consequent product 
innovation in most countries and this provided borrowers with greater choice 
and allowed lenders to manage their portfolios of assets more actively (Lunde et 
al., 2008). The degree to which this affected balance sheets even in countries 
that had not themselves followed the derivative model only became clear when 
the system failed in late 2008 (Lunde et al., 2008). Initially mortgage lenders 
were faced with the prospect of holding increasing capital on existing mortgages 
based on each loan's mortgage category and also as the borrower's LTV ratio 
(Healey, 2013:66). Capital needed on these categories fluctuated from a low of 
35% risk weighting on plain-vanilla loans under 60% LTV to 200% for non-
qualified, high-LTV mortgages (Healey, 2013:66). Capital requirements on the 
industry's $2.4 trillion of residential mortgages would have increased materially 
and possibly duplicated the loan-loss reserves. Fortunately, this proposal was 
withdrawn because it was considered to be dismissed with the upcoming QM 
standard under the Dodd-Frank Act (Healey, 2013:66). The QM rule, which 
forbids risky products such as interest-only loans and negative-amortisation 
loans, came into effect on 10 January 2014 even though the Basel III proposal 
was withdrawn (Healey, 2013:66). The mortgage servicers did not do well; 
banks and savings and loans associations that have mortgage servicing assets 
(MSAs) on their balance sheet will have to keep largely more capital against this 
asset than they did prior to the Basel III implementation (Healey, 2013:66). 
According to Bloomberg (2012), Rene van Wyk, South Africa’s Pretoria-based 
Registrar of Banks, said that under Basel III, a global set of banking rules will be 
implemented over the next six years. The Registrar can apply a counter-cyclical 
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buffer, which means that lenders would hold extra capital when the Registrar 
determines that credit growth is too much (Bloomberg, 2012). 
3.9 SUMMARY 
In order to see what the impact of the NCA had on residential mortgages, one 
needs to look at the background of the NCA. This chapter covered the NCA and 
how credit was regulated before the implementation of the NCA. It also gives a 
detailed discussion on mortgage lending and the banks. 
This chapter also covered the roles of the NCA and NCR, followed by the three 
types of regulation and international regulation outside Africa. The sub-prime 
crisis in the US was discussed and an overview of the Basel Accords concluded 
the chapter. The research methodology will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology used in this 
study. According to Talla (2013:61), methodology is a description and analysis 
of methods chosen, their limitations and resources, their assumptions and con-
sequences. Research methodology ought to be seen as a system through which 
a researcher is able to collect, analyse and interpret data to reach the aims and 
objectives of the research (Moaisi, 2013:56). 
Research methodology focuses on the process of research and the decisions 
that the researcher has to take to execute the research project (Khuzwayo, 
2013:31): 
 Which decisions need to be made as the research progresses? 
 Which method(s) and technique(s) for data collection and data analysis 
should be selected? 
 Which factors play a role in the design of the research project? 
 What influence does the particular purpose of the research problem have 
on the selection of methods and technique? 
 Which factors play a role in the process of research and how do these 
factors affect the methodology of the researcher? 
Firstly, a description of the research method and research design is given in 
section 4.2, followed by the data, sources of data and the population in section 
4.3. The research hypotheses are set out in section 4.4. Techniques used for 
data analysis are discussed, namely descriptive and inferential statistics, in sec-
tion 4.5. Section 4.6 presents tests for reliability and validity of data. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
A research design is the framework, outline or plan for the research project which 
can be used as a guideline for data collection and analysis (Wiid & Diggines, 
67 
2013:55). Cooper and Schindler (2014:148) also define the research design as 
the blueprint for meeting the objectives and answering the questions. To design 
something means that the pieces fit together, including the fit between objec-
tives, research approach and research tactics (Aaker, Kumar, Leone & Day, 
2013:63). Cooper and Schindler (2014:125) point out that there are numerous 
definitions of research design and some differ in detail, but together they give 
the following essentials of a research design: 
 It is an activity- and time-based plan. 
 The plan is based on the research question. 
 It can be used as a guide for selecting sources and types of information. 
 It can be used as a framework for stipulating the relationships between the 
variables of the study. 
 Every research activity has a procedural outline. 
There are many specific designs and these can be grouped into three main 
research designs (see Figure 4.1), namely exploratory, descriptive and causal 
research (Gopaul, 2013:63). An exploratory research study tends towards loose 
structures with the aim of finding future research tasks and the purpose of all 
exploration is normally to form hypotheses or questions for further research 
(Cooper & Schindler, 2014:126). In causal research the researcher investigates 
whether one variable causes or changes the value of another variable (Tustin et 
al., 2005:87). The causal research design is most suitable for when the re-
searcher wants to understand which independent variables affect a dependent 
variable (Gopaul, 2013:64). According to Wiid and Diggines (2013:57), a de-
scriptive study is a statistical method used to recognise patterns or trends in a 
situation, but not causal relations among its different elements. 
This research study is descriptive, under the conclusive design. Conclusive 
design assists the researcher in studying the research problem in a conclusive 
manner, and from numerous alternatives from which a possible course of action 
is selected (Wiid & Diggines, 2013:57). This is essential when the knowledge of 
a particular market or topic is unclear (Wiid & Diggines, 2013:55). The purpose 
of descriptive research is to give an accurate picture of some aspect of the 
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market environment (Aaker et al., 2013:66). Another objective of descriptive 
research is to answer the who, what, when and how of the topic and it can be 
either simple or complex (Cooper & Emory, 1995:121). Figure 4.1 below illus-
trates the three main research designs, namely exploratory, descriptive and 
causal research (Gopaul 2013:63). 
 
Figure 4.1: Types of research designs 
Source:  Adapted from Gopaul (2013:63) 
There are two types of research methods: qualitative and quantitative. The 
design of a research study is based on the purpose of the study (Khuzwayo, 
2013:33). A quantitative method is likely to be undertaken if descriptive informa-
tion is required; if the purpose is to generate new ideas, then the qualitative 
method may be in order (Khuzwayo, 2013:33). Qualitative research is an ap-
proach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups 
assign to a human or social problem (Creswell, 2014:4). This study applies the 
quantitative research design using time series secondary data. In quantitative 
studies, data obtained from the participants is coded, categorised and reduced 
to numbers so that this data can be manipulated for statistical analysis (Cooper 
& Schindler, 2014:148). 
Luyirika (2010:40–41) identifies the following advantages of quantitative re-
search: 
 Quantitative research is objective, controlled, systematic, valid and reliable. 
 It identifies the hard facts and numbers related to the issue. 
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 It uses methods adopted from the physical sciences that are designed to 
ensure objectivity, generalisability and reliability. 
 Quantitative research is the numerical representation and manipulation of 
observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena 
that those observations reflect. 
This research is quantitative in nature since it uses numerical data and data 
analysis procedures, including both graphs and statistics (Dowelani, 2012:36). 
Numerical data is sometimes named quantifiable and those whose values are 
measured or calculated numerically as quantities (Saunders et al., 2009:418). 
According to Leedy (1993:127), the research design (methodology) involves 
four questions: 
 What data is needed? 
 Where is the data collected? 
 How will the data be obtained? 
 How will the data be interpreted? 
These questions are discussed in the sections that follow. 
4.3 DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION 
The reason why secondary data is preferred to primary data is the need for 
accuracy of the data and the comprehensiveness that it offers, as it is put 
together by experienced researchers specific to an industry (Pillay, 2009:80). 
Examples of secondary data are publications such as the quarterly reports of 
the SARB or reports of the Bureau for Financial Analysis (BFA), and electronic 
information networks. 
Primary data is data that has not been collected previously, in other words, it did 
not exist previously and is collected to solve a specific problem (Wiid & Diggines, 
2013:85). Pillay (2009:81) purports that primary data does not have the same 
comprehensiveness as secondary data, because of the lack of resources on the 
part of the individual collecting and compiling the data due to limitations on 
financial means. Incorrect authority levels to approach large corporations, capa-
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city limitations on the collection of data in a specified time frame as well as lack 
of expertise when working in isolation also makes collection of primary data at 
the required level of completeness and accuracy unreasonable (Pillay, 2009: 
81). 
Tustin et al., (2005:484) list various reasons for researchers conducting second-
ary analysis: 
 The collection of primary data is very expensive. 
 Knowledge is cumulative. 
 The results of previous research can be verified, resulting in scientific enquiry 
progression. 
 Data that has been verified by various researchers as being outstanding 
can be used for in-depth research as well as for research teaching. 
 The usage of secondary data permits for time series analysis and compari-
sons. 
 Secondary data analysis methods have been progressing rapidly. 
 Secondary data analysis enables the researcher to perform difficult com-
parative studies, using meta-analytical techniques. 
The weakness of using secondary data (information is collected for purposes 
other than the study) was not applicable in this study, as banks need to comply 
with the NCA and the compliance information is exactly what was needed for 
the purpose of the study. Registered data on monthly residential mortgages was 
obtained from Lightstone Property for the period January 2001 to August 2011. 
Monthly data was also obtained from the BA900 of the SARB for the same 
period. The mortgage data that was collected and used was residential mort-
gage data of households because that is the data that is subject to NCA regula-
tion and applicable to this study. 
Total mortgage numbers and values granted for the period January 2008 to 
January 2014 were collected for this research. The reason for using data from 
2008 is that prior to 2008 there might have been variances and discrepancies in 
the data as some definitions changed between the old DI900 and new BA900 
forms. Furthermore, there were also some differences between the accounts 
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included/not included by the banks prior to 2008. It is only from 2008 that details 
of residential mortgages applied for and granted were given. Further advance 
numbers and values were also collected for this research. Registered data on 
monthly further advances was obtained from Lightstone Property for the period 
January 2001 to August 2011. A further advance is when a second bond is 
registered over the property in order to get additional funds (Standard Bank, 
2015). It can be used in various ways; the funds from the home loan can be 
used to improve the property’s value by making alterations or additions to the 
home or for personal use (Standard Bank, 2015). 
Total mortgages include commercial, farm and residential mortgages. Commer-
cial mortgage and farm mortgage data was not included. Although the value of 
these mortgages applied for is reported, the main focus of this study was the 
number of residential mortgage applications registered and total mortgage ad-
vances granted. The values of the residential mortgages and the values of total 
mortgages approved were also taken into account. When analysing time series 
data, one is mainly interested in what happens to the variable being studied 
over time (Chisasa, 2014:85). To predict the future behaviour of this variable is 
the purpose of the time series (Chisasa, 2014:85). 
The following data was collected: 
 Total number and rand value of residential mortgages registered; 
 Residential mortgages granted after the NCA; 
 Total number and rand value of mortgage advances granted, consisting of 
new residential mortgage advances granted, re-advances on residential 
mortgages granted and commercial and farm mortgages granted; 
 Number and rand value of further advances on residential bonds registered. 
When using a quantitative methodology, the researcher seeks data that can be 
analysed statistically to create quantified results (Mtimkuli, 2009:32). In this study 
data was analysed for the period before the enactment of the National Credit 
Act (January 2001 to March 2005) and the results were compared with data for 
the period June 2007 to August 2011, being the period of the promulgation of 
the NCA. The purpose of using 2007 as a base year was to minimise the effects 
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of confounding factors such as external shocks that cannot be fully controlled. 
In this study, the introduction of the NCA served as a shock appearing in the 
period under review. Although the NCA was approved in March 2005, it was 
only implemented on 1 June 2007. 
The NCA was implemented to curb reckless lending. Prior to 2007, financial 
institutions charged consumers ridiculously high interest rates. The South African 
consumer credit market was controlled by the Usury Act and the Credit Agree-
ments Act before the main provisions of the NCA came into effect on 1 June 
2007 (De Clercq, 2013). The main purpose of the Usury Act was disclosure (of 
credit information to the borrower) and restriction (the maximum, and types of 
fees and financing rates that could be charged), while the Credit Agreements 
Act put in place additional regulating measures, for example the term of the 
agreement and deposits the borrower had to pay as part of the credit purchas-
ing process (De Clercq, 2013). 
The previous Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, had meetings with the 
Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) and members of the banking in-
dustry on 27 August 2012 and 19 October 2012 in an attempt to address the 
problem areas of lending and the increase in overdue consumers (De Clercq 
2013). The agreement was made that responsible lending needed to improve, 
while methods should be implemented to stop households going into a debt 
spiral (De Clercq, 2013). 
Since the date of the implementation of the NCA is known (1 June 2007), the 
behaviour of applications before and after implementation can be analysed 
using the t-test in order to minimise the effects of confounding factors such as 
external shocks, which include the increase of interest rates and inflation. Time 
series data of monthly approved residential mortgage applications in the year 
prior to the NCA is compared with time series data of monthly approved appli-
cations from 2008–2011. 
Population 
Population is defined as the total group of people from whom information is 
required (Wiid & Diggines, 2013:186). Caution must be applied when using the 
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word population; normally we mean the people who live in a particular place, 
such as the population of South Africa, but in research the word has a more 
specific meaning: it means the people you want to reach a conclusion about 
(Walker, 2010:21). The researcher must be certain what the population is when 
carrying out a study and always be certain they know exactly who or what they 
want to make a conclusion about (Walker, 2010:22). The target population for 
this study was the South African banks that approved residential loans between 
1 January 2001 and 31 August 2011. Sampling was not applicable to this study 
because the analysis covered all the banks. The total population size of the 
study was 102 banks, comprising 51 banks prior to the NCA and 51 banks after 
the introduction of the NCA. The banks included all the banks that were regis-
tered in terms of the Banks Act for the relevant periods and were legally required 
to send their DI/BA forms to the SARB. The banks are normally constant, but 
sometimes banks join or deregister. 
4.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
A hypothesis can be defined as a prediction about what will be seen in a piece 
of research (Walker, 2010:247). Two kinds of hypotheses are used in classical 
tests of significance, namely the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis 
(Cooper and Emory, 1995:434). The null hypothesis (Ho) is a statement that no 
difference exists between the parameter and the statistic being compared to it 
(Cooper and Emory,1995:434). The alternative hypothesis (H1) is the hypothesis 
that is accepted if the null hypothesis is rejected (Croucher, 2010:826). 
Two main hypotheses were formulated to guide this study. Both are based on 
Objectives 1 and 4. 
Objective 1 
The first objective was to determine the impact of the National Credit Act on 
residential mortgage financing in South Africa and to draw a comparison be-
tween pre- and post-NCA to see if there was a change in residential mortgage 
lending. From this objective, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
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 H0: The means for the two groups of data sets representing the pre- and 
post-NCA periods are equal. 
 Ha: The means are not equal. 
Objective 4 
The fourth objective was to determine the effect of the implementation of the 
NCA on further advances in SA. To this end, the following hypotheses were 
formulated: 
 H0: The NCA has no effect on further advances. 
 Ha: The NCA has an effect on further advances. 
4.5 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES APPLIED 
This study aimed to investigate the impact that the NCA has had on residential 
mortgage applications through banks over the period 2001–2011. The following 
secondary objectives were formulated and how it was analysed: 
i) To determine if the NCA has had a positive or negative impact on resi-
dential mortgage financing in South Africa. T-test (comparison of means), 
descriptive statistics correlation analysis and trend analysis were used. 
ii) To determine whether implementation of the NCA affected the acceptance 
rates of total mortgage lending. Trend analysis using number and values 
were used. 
iii) To examine the trend of residential mortgages after the imple¬mentation of 
the NCA. Trend analysis using number and values were used. 
iv) To determine the effect of the implementation of the NCA on further ad-
vances on mortgages in South Africa. t-test (comparison of means) , de-
scriptive statistics correlation analysis and trend analysis were used. 
Collected data should be edited, coded and tabulated in order to assist with the 
processing and analysis (Gopaul, 2013:84). The researcher must later translate 
the data into meaningful information (Wiid & Diggines, 2013:36). Data analysis 
can be defined as reducing accumulated data to a manageable size, looking for 
patterns, developing summaries and applying statistical techniques (Cooper & 
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Schindler, 2014:86), and Gopaul (2013:84) defines data analysis as the appli-
cation of reasoning to understand the data that has been gathered. The reason 
behind data analysis is to understand the various elements of the data, by 
evaluating the relationships between concepts and identifying any patterns or 
trends, or to identify themes in the data (Dilotsotlhe, 2013:46). To identify the 
similarities and differences in the data is another reason for using data analysis 
(Dilotsotlhe, 2013:46). There are a lot of computer programs available which 
researchers can use in order to assist in data processing and analysis (Wiid & 
Diggines, 2013:36). 
However, for the purpose of this study, the results were captured and then 
analysed by means of the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) Enterprise Guide 
4.3. The correlation analysis was carried out by using the Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS). The analysis of data was done using the following tech-
niques: 
 Trend analysis; 
 Descriptive analysis; 
 Normality test; 
 Correlation analysis; 
 T-test. 
Each of these is elaborated on in the sections that follow. 
4.5.1 Trend analysis 
When an independent variable is measureable, it is often more useful to take 
into account the overall relation between the treatment group means and the 
levels of the independent variable, rather than to make comparisons between 
two means (Myers, Well & Lorch, 2010:271). Such analyses of the function 
linking the dependent and independent variable are often referred to as trend 
analysis (Myers et al., 2010:271). The trend may be defined as the long-term 
underlying growth movement in a time series, and as such it can only be deter-
mined if the data is accessible for a substantial time (Croucher, 2010:558). An 
analysis of the trend of the observations is also vital for studying the progress of 
events and for an overall review of prevailing conditions (Croucher, 2010:558). 
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Secondary data, mainly time series secondary data, lends itself to analysis in 
order to explain trends (Tustin et al., 2005:487). 
The data from trend studies can be analysed only in the aggregate form in 
which they are gathered (Aaker et al., 2013:288). In this study trend analysis 
was used to evaluate trends of the impact of the NCA on residential mortgage 
lending for the period 2001–2011. Trend analysis was used for objectives 2, 3 
and 4. Visual and statistical exploration (data visualisation) can be used to iden-
tify strengths (Cooper & Schindler, 2014:106). 
4.5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the data. They focus on the collec-
tion and display of information (Croucher, 2010:226). The purpose of descriptive 
statistics is to investigate the distribution of scores for each variable and to 
determine whether the scores on different variables are linked to each other 
(Dilotsotlhe, 2013:47). The techniques include measures of variability such as 
the variance and standard deviation, a measure of central tendency and the 
mean, which can be presented either numerically or visually using graphs 
(Gopaul, 2013:85). Measures of central tendency are the midpoint in a set of 
numbers, also called the averages (Walker, 2010:246). 
When the purpose of the analysis is simply to describe a set of data, then 
descriptive statistics are appropriate (Howell, 2009:6). Descriptive statistical 
analysis of the pre-NCA period, from January 2001 – March 2005 and post-
NCA period, from June 2007 – August 2011 was done and also for the whole 
period without division, 2001–2011. According to Saunders et al., (2009:444), 
descriptive statistics allow a researcher to describe and compare variables nu-
merically. 
Vogt (2007:57) states that descriptive analysis can be used in at least three 
ways: 
i) Compare it with inferential statistics. 
ii) Compare it to multivariate statistics, namely with statistics that study more 
than one variable at a time. 
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iii) Compare it with approaches to data that try to discover causes, even when 
this casual work does not lead to attempts to draw inferences about a popu-
lation from a sample (Vogt, 2007:58). 
The following descriptive statistics were used to make a comparison between 
the period prior to and after the NCA . Data was analysed using the standard 
deviation, mean and variance. These are explained below. 
4.5.2.1 Standard deviation (SD) 
One way of describing dispersion is through standard deviation. Dispersion 
describes how the data values are scattered around central tendency and is 
only possible for numerical data (Saunders et al., 2009:447). SD can be defined 
as a measure of variability of a group of scores and indicates how much the 
scores are spread out (high SD) or are grouped together (low SD) (Vogt, 2007: 
19). 
Standard deviation is calculated as follows: 
s = √
∑ (x - x̅)
2
n - 1
 
Where: 
s = standard deviation 
  = sum of 
X = each value in the data set 
n-1 = number of values -1 
x̅ = the mean of a sample of scores 
4.5.2.2 Mean 
The mean is one way of measuring central tendency and it is also the most 
well-known measure of central tendency. Central tendency describes data for 
both samples and populations quantitatively, typically to give a general impres-
sion of values that could be seen as common, middling or average (Saunders et 
al., 2009:444). The mean can be defined as the sum of scores divided by the 
number of scores (Howell, 2009:66). 
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It can be calculated as follows: 
Sample mean Population mean 
x̅ =  
∑ x
n
 μ = 
∑ x
N
 
 
Where: 
∑ x = sum of all data values 
N = number of data items in population 
n = number of data items in sample 
This study used the population mean (µ) because it is the most important 
parameter of a distribution and information is often needed about the value of µ, 
or whether or not µ has changed due to external factors must be determined 
(Steyn, Smit, Du Toit & Strasheim, 1994:420). 
4.5.2.3 Variance 
Variance is the sum of the squared deviations about the mean divided by the 
sample size (Howell, 2009: 90). It can be calculated as follows: 
s2 =  
∑(Xi-X̅)
2
n
 
Where: 
Xi = each value in the data set 
n = number of values 
x̅ = the mean of a sample of scores 
4.5.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test for normality 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS), a non-parametric test was used to determine if 
data was normally distributed. The KS is a one-sample test and suitable when 
the data is at least ordinal and the research situation calls for a comparison of 
an observed sample distribution with a theoretical distribution (Cooper & Emory, 
1995:647). The KS is a test of goodness-of-fit and determines the point at which 
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the two sets of frequencies deviate the most, that is the maximum deviation (D) 
between the cumulative theoretical frequency distribution and the cumulative 
observed frequency distribution (Tustin et al., 2005:613). D can be calculated as 
follows: 
D = maximum FO(X) - FT(X)| 
Where: 
FO(X) = the observed cumulative frequency distribution of a random sample 
of n observations 
X = any possible score 
FO(X) = k/n 
k = the number of observations equal to or less than X 
FT(X) = the theoretical frequency distribution under HO 
The Shapiro Wild (w), Cramervon Mises (w-sq), and Aderson Darling (A-sq) tests 
for normality were conducted in order to confirm results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (D) normality test. 
4.5.4 Correlation analysis 
After observing the trend of the variables, the strength of the association is de-
termined using the correlation coefficient (Chisasa, 2014:85). Correlation deals 
with the relationship between two variables, and the measure of the degree or 
strength of this relationship is represented by a correlation coefficient (Howell, 
2009:189). Correlation answers questions between numbers 0 and 1; when the 
answer is close to 0, then the two measurements have a weak relationship, but 
when it is close to 1, then there is a strong relationship between the two meas-
urements (Walker, 2010:181). The sign of correlation coefficient (+/-) shows the 
direction and the value is indicative of the strength (Pillay, 2009:75). The 
Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of the extent to which two quanti-
tative variables are linearly related and is represented by the symbol r which 
can vary from -1.0 to +1.0 (Myers et al., 2010:443). 
The correlation coefficient r represents: 
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r = 
degree to which X & Y vary together
degree to which X & Y vary seperately
 
r = 
covariance of X & Y
variance of X & Y
 
Source:  Pillay (2009:75) 
Correlation can be positive or negative. When a correlation is positive, it means 
that when one measure increases, the other tends to increase also (Walker, 
2010:184). When r = 1, a perfect positive relationship exists and it is proved that 
-1 ≤ r ≤ 1 (Steyn et al., 1994:491). 
 
 
 
Positive relationship (+1) 
A correlation coefficient of 0 suggests that the movements are totally random 
and an increase by variable X provides no insight into the expected movement 
of variable Y (Pillay, 2009:76). There is a perfect non-linear relationship be-
tween X and Y when r = 0 (Steyn et al., 1994:491). 
 
 
 
Non-correlation (0) 
A correlation coefficient of -1.00 suggests that two variables move in the oppo-
site direction at all times. If variable X increases in value, variable Y would be 
expected to decrease in value (Pillay, 2009:76). When r = -1 a perfect linear 
relationship exists between X and Y (Steyn et al., 1994:491). 
X Y 
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Negative relationship (-1) 
In this study, the relationship between the numbers and values of residential 
bonds registered and also the values and numbers of further advances regis-
tered were determined. The period was from January 2001 – August 2011. 
4.5.5 Inferential statistics 
Inferential statistics help draw conclusions about a population on the basis of 
information about samples drawn from it (Vogt, 2007:11). The main purpose of 
inferential statistics is to draw inferences about parameters from statistics and 
the corresponding values in the population are known as parameters (Howell, 
2009:7). To assist with analysis and interpretation in this study, the data clean-
ing was performed in a way that made it appropriate for analysis, as recom-
mended by Chisasa (2014:75). 
The two general classes of significance tests are parametric and non-para-
metric tests (Cooper & Schindler, 2014:440). Parametric tests are more power-
ful because the data comes from interval and ratio measurements, while non-
parametric tests are used to test hypotheses with nominal and ordinal data 
(Cooper & Schindler, 2014:440). Vogt (2007:68) maintains that “the non-
parametric tests are applied to techniques that make no assumptions about 
population parameters and distributions (such as that these are normal)”. 
“Powerful” means that if there is really a difference between the two groups, a 
powerful test is likely to see it (Walker, 2010:172). The two most common 
correlation tests are the Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient and 
Spearman’s rho. The Pearson test is used for the parametric procedure and the 
Spearman test is used for the non-parametric test (Walker, 2010:195). The 
Pearson correlation was used for this study. 
X 
 
Y 
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Often in practice, there are situations in which the parameters of two popu-
lations have to be compared (Steyn et al., 1994:428). The t-test was used in this 
study to compare the effect of the NCA prior to and after its implementation. 
Cooper and Schindler (2014:440) identify the following principles for parametric 
tests: 
 The observations must be independent, for example the selection of any 
one case should not influence the chances of any other case of being in-
cluded in the sample. 
 The observations should be taken from normally distributed populations. 
 These populations should have the same variances. 
 The measurement scales should at least be interval so that arithmetic 
operations can be used with them. 
4.5.6 The t-test 
The t-test, which is commonly known as the Student's t-distribution, is used to 
compare two sets of numbers to see whether or not they are different, even 
when the sets of numbers are quite small (Walker, 2010:176). There are two 
types of t-tests that determine if the means of the two subsamples are different; 
one t-test assumes that the variances of the samples are equal and the other 
assumes that the variances are not equal. In order to determine which t-test to 
use, a variance ratio F-test must first be performed. The F-test is determined by 
two parameters, v1 and v2, which are known as the degrees of freedom (DF) of 
distribution (Steyn et al., 1994:368). It is assumed that each of the two popu-
lations is normally distributed in testing for a difference between two variances 
when using the F-test (Berenson, Levine & Krehbiel, 2012:394). According to 
Berenson et al., (2012:394), the F-test is very sensitive to the normality as-
sumption and if boxplots or normal probability plots imply even a slight differ-
ence from normality for any of the two populations, the F-test should not be used. 
Usually, the validity of the t-test demands that the samples be drawn from 
normally distributed populations with equal (population) standard deviations. 
Fortunately, the central limit theorem guarantees the validity of the t-test even if 
the populations are not normally distributed. Normally, the t-test is robust in 
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moderate departures from normality so that p-values obtained can be validly 
interpreted. The pooled-variance t-test can be used to determine whether there 
is a significant difference between the means of the two populations if it is 
assumed that the random samples are independently selected from two 
populations and that the populations are normally distributed and have equal 
variances (Berenson et al., 2012:366). The pooled-variance t-test can still be 
used if the sample sizes are large enough (˃30 for each sample) even though 
data is not normally distributed (Berenson et al., 2012:366). 
Usually, it is not necessary to perform preliminary tests for normality and equal-
ity of variances, as practice has shown that such tests often detect differences 
too small to affect the t-test. Fortunately, these days statistical software pack-
ages enable easy computation of both the equal and unequal variance t-test 
and comparison if they differ. It should be noted, however, that the unequal vari-
ance t-test is less powerful than the equal variance t-test because it uses fewer 
assumptions. 
Should there be sufficient reasons to believe that the conditions for the validity 
of the independent t-test are violated, the best approach is to transform the data 
to a scale in which the conditions are satisfied. For percentages, arcsin or log 
transformation could be used. The Mann-Whitney test (1947) and Wilcoxon’s 
rank sum test (1945) are the two choices when comparing the distributions in 
two conditions and these conditions comprise different entities (Field, 2013: 
219). The Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test which is an alternative to 
the independent-samples t-test and can be used to compare two separate 
groups, but for some reason a t-test is not possible (Walker, 2010:232). Ac-
cording to Vogt (2007:68), “the awkward term non-parametric is applied to tech-
niques that make no assumptions about population parameters and distribu-
tions (such as that these are normal)”. 
Non-parametric statistics are created for research in which the variables are 
measured at low levels (nominal and/or ordinal) (Vogt 2007:68). The Wilcoxon 
test is used where there are two sets of scores to be compared, but these scores 
come from the same participants (Field, 2013:228). This test checks whether 
the two samples have identical distributions and whether the differences in the 
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ranks between the two groups are statistically significant (Dowelani, 2012:47). 
This test can be more powerful than the t-test in instances where the latter is 
not suitable, and it has excellent efficiency (Cooper & Schindler, 2014:613). 
According to Field (2013:219), these tests are both equivalent. 
The formula for the t-test is: 
t = 
X̅T  −  X̅C
√
varT
nT
 + 
varC
nC
 
Where: 
X̅T = pre-NCA granted mortgage loan mean 
varT = variance 
nT = number of monthly observations 
X̅C = post-NCA granted mortgage loan mean 
varC = variance 
nC = number of monthly observations 
The t-value will be positive if the pre-NCA mean is larger than the post-NCA 
mean. Once the t-value is computed, the significance level is determined to test 
whether the ratio is large enough to conclude that the difference between the 
pre-NCA mean and the post-NCA mean is not likely to have been a chance 
finding. 
4.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Reliability and validity are important aspects of all research designs and meas-
urement techniques (Vogt, 2007:113). Goodwin (2010:134) asserts that for any 
measure to be of value in research, it should be adequately reliable and valid. 
The reliability and validity assigned to secondary data are functions of the 
method through which the data was gathered and the source (Saunders et al., 
2009:274). The source here is referred to as assessing the authority or repu-
tation (Saunders et al., 2009:274). SARB data is audited by reputable audit 
firms. “Reliability” refers to consistency of either measurement or design (Vogt, 
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2007:114). The secondary data that was used in the study was collected from 
the SARB and was unlikely to have any bias and measurement errors because 
the data was reliable and credible. In the research, reliability was ensured by 
stating the literature sources on which the theoretical views were based. 
Chapter 2 and 3 explained the conceptual framework of mortgage lending, a 
detailed background of the NCA and credit regulation. The population that was 
chosen was consistent and representative of the banks in South Africa. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was also used as a measurement for reliability. 
“Validity” refers to whether an instrument actually measures what it was de-
signed to measure (Field, 2013:12). The validity of the instrument answers 
questions like “Does the instrument really measure what its designer claims it 
does?” Flawed research procedures, poor samples and inaccurate measuring 
instruments that lead to invalid results are common research errors (Phenya, 
2011:56). There are two types of validity, namely internal and external validity. 
Internal validity is when the results that were obtained from the research study 
are a true reflection of the characteristic being measured and have not been 
manipulated by interfering factors (Dilotsotlhe, 2013:51). Gordis (2000:120) de-
fines external validity as how the findings of a given study will be extrapolated to 
the wider general population. Reliable sources were used where stringent meas-
ures were taken to ensure accuracy and validity of the data. 
4.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the methodology and research design used in the study were 
discussed. The quantitative research methodology was used as it was appropri-
ate to the objectives of the study and the type of data collected and analysed. 
Secondary data was used in this study. The population, the selection and the 
techniques used to collect the data and the manner in which data would be 
analysed and interpreted were discussed as part of the research design. The 
measures applicable to test the reliability and validity of the data were also 
discussed. The next chapter will present the results of the data collected from 
the research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to report on and discuss the results of the data 
analysis. Data was captured and analysed by means of the Statistical Analysis 
System (SAS) Enterprise Guide 4.3. Correlation analysis was carried out by 
using SPSS. The chapter is divided into descriptive and inferential statistics 
sections. 
5.2 TREND ANALYSIS 
In this section the activity on the mortgage bond market in South Africa is track-
ed for the period 2001 to 2011. The analysis uses both volume and rand value 
time series data for all the objectives. The trend analysis was done using graphs. 
This is in line with Chisasa and Makina (2012).  
5.2.1 Number of residential bonds registered 
To determine if the NCA had a positive or negative impact on residential mort-
gage financing in SA was objective 1. A trend analysis of the number of regis-
tered bonds was conducted and the results are shown in Figure 5.1 below. This 
analysis covers the period before and after the implementation of the NCA. The 
purpose is to give an overview of the patterns of residential bond registrations in 
South Africa. Although bond registration was characterised by fluctuations, a 
general upward trend is observable from January 2001 to July/August 2007.  
A subsequent downward trend follows for the remaining period under review 
(August 2007 to June 2011). 
A closer look at Figure 5.1 shows that there was a drop in the number of regis-
tered bonds between January and April 2001 and a steady increase thereafter. 
High interest rates and high unemployment could have played a role. In mid-
2007 residential bond registrations dropped, coinciding with the implementation 
of the NCA in 2007. In the aftermath of the implementation of the NCA, a 
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declining trend experienced in 2008 was driven by the lagged effect of the 
interest rate cycle, the NCA, stricter criteria by the banks and financial diffi-
culties experienced by consumers, as demonstrated in Table 5.1 (Pillay, 2009: 
89). 
By the end of 2008, the strict contraction in nominal house price growth trig-
gered real growth to move into negative numbers, which clearly affected the 
extension of new mortgage loans (Luttig, 2010:20). The contraction in the mort-
gage market was further helped by the concerns of a recession and the 
changes in the lending criteria of the four major banks, with all four unwilling to 
lend anything more than 80% of the value of the house by the end of 2008 
(Luttig, 2010:20). The number of mortgages stabilised as from 2008. The num-
ber of mortgage agreements entered into grew by 12.13% for the quarter ended 
December 2009, but on a year-on-year basis the number of mortgage agree-
ments entered into showed an extra decline of 28.78% (Luttig, 2010:21). The 
majority (79.87%) of mortgages granted benefited people with a gross monthly 
income greater than R15 000 (Luttig, 2010:21). From 2008 the number of 
registered bonds declined rapidly until 2011. 
 
Figure 5.1:  Total number of residential bonds registered 
What is also known is that a few external factors played a role in the decline in 
mortgage lending. These include the 2008/9 global financial recession, increase 
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in interest rates and the financial crisis in the US. According to Landie (2013:3), 
a slowdown was felt post-2007 until 2009 as a consequence of the financial 
crisis. The sub-prime crisis did not affect South Africa in the same way that it 
affected the US and mortgage extensions by credit providers began dropping 
drastically after 2007. Mortgage loans became less attractive to credit providers 
because of the following (NCR 2012:56): 
 The lack of growth in the property market provided less opportunity. 
 The value of residential property was decreasing. 
 The time of recovery lengthened, partially prompted by the introduction of 
the NCA and the delay it caused in the legal process. The risk experience of 
mortgage loans also changed, where previously a consumer would default 
on other agreements first and do whatever possible to keep their home, the 
debt counselling 60-day period saw consumers also stop the servicing of 
their home loan during this period. 
 Bond originators impacted margins at the credit providers (although they 
provided consumers with a mechanism to shop around and compare). 
 The cost of long-term funding went up significantly − i.e. the cost for the 
credit provider in terms of raising funds to match the long-term nature of 
their home loan book increased significantly, eroding the profitability of this 
particular type of lending (NCR, 2012:56). 
From the trend analysis, it is evident that there was a decrease in the number of 
residential bonds registered. The decrease may have been as a result of the 
implementation of the NCA. As such, it can be concluded that the introduction of 
the NCA had a positive impact on residential bonds. 
5.2.2 Rand value of residential bonds registered 
As depicted in Figure 5.2, there was an increase in the value of registered 
bonds from January 2001 to January 2002. The rand value of aggregate bond 
registrations increased from May 2002 to January 2004. The trend of the value 
of registered bonds followed the same trend as the number of registered bonds, 
the only difference being the number of credit facilities that improved in some 
income groupings (although the rand value declined), implying a lower average 
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facility being granted. The SARB provide a commercial vs residential split in the 
value of mortgage loans granted, and from this it is evident that both sectors 
contributed to the broad slowing in growth, although at 2.8% year-on-year 
growth by December 2014, it seemed that the residential sector was the weaker 
of the two (Loos & Swanepoel, 2015:3). The growth in value of new residential 
mortgages granted was 28.7% in August 2013 during the second post-reces-
sion mortgage lending flow, before the slow broad tapering started (Loos & 
Swanepoel, 2015:3). 
This proves objective 1, this proves that the NCA had a positive effect on the 
housing loan market because fewer mortgages were approved.  
 
Figure 5.2:  Total value of residential bonds registered (Rands) 
5.2.3 Mortgage application acceptance rates (2008 – 2014) 
To determine whether implementation of the NCA affected the acceptance rates 
of total mortgage lending was objective 2. For objective 2, the total mortgages 
approved from January 2008 until January 2014 are considered. The accept-
ance rate is calculated as the total number of mortgages granted divided by the 
number of mortgages applied for. Total mortgages include commercial, farm 
and residential mortgages. Results (see Figure 5.3) of this study confirm the 
findings of previous studies discussed in the literature review chapter, namely 
90 
that the NCA influenced the acceptance rates downwards as from October 2008. 
These results also show that consumers whose mortgages were approved by 
the banks adhered to the NCA rules and legislation. Figure 5.3 clearly illustrates 
the effect of the NCA on the acceptance rate, and indicates a decline in 
mortgage advances. This result suggests that the introduction of the NCA had a 
positive influence on the number of applications or supply of mortgage finance. 
Therefore, by introducing the NCA, the authorities were successful in reducing 
reckless lending as was the case before the introduction of the NCA. In the 
study by Pillay (2009:108), it was found that the slowdown in the SA residential 
property market compounded by the banks' reluctance to approve bonds and 
the government's stringent enforcement of the National Credit Act, has affected 
amongst others the formal real estate industry. This also proves objective 2 of 
this research, namely that the NCA had an effect because fewer mortgages 
were approved. 
 
Figure 5.3:  Mortgage application acceptance rate 
5.2.4 Trends in the number of mortgage advances granted 
Figure 5.4 displays the total number of mortgage advances applied for and 
Figure 5.5 displays the mortgage advances granted. The number of mortgage 
advances applied for decreased significantly after the implementation of the NCA. 
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Previously, too much credit was granted to those who could not really afford it 
and the rate of approvals for such loans dropped drastically as a result of the 
NCA (Pieterse, 2009:160). Prior to the implementation of the NCA, the year-on-
year change in mortgage advances showed a stable growth from 24.5% (2004) 
to 28.6% (2005), closing in 2006 at 30.4% as depicted in Table 5.1 (Pillay, 2009: 
90) The year-on-year change in mortgage advances post-implementation of the 
NCA shows a decline from 30.4% (2006) to 25.3% (2007), dropping to 13.2% 
(2008) (Pillay, 2009:90). The biggest decline was in mortgage advances granted, 
because between December 2007 and June 2009 this figure dropped by 66.77% 
(CCR, 2009:1). This is displayed in Table 5.1. The contribution of mortgages 
towards total credit granted decreased from 56.55% to 39.65% in the June 2009 
quarter (Consumer Credit Report 2009:1). The percentage share of mortgage 
advances granted, against total credit granted, dropped from 51.8% in December 
2007 to 23.9% in December 2012 (NCR, 2013:7). 
 
Figure 5.4:  Number of mortgage advances applied for 
Data from the NCR reveals a similar picture of slowing growth through 2014, 
with growth in mortgage credit granted to households having peaked at 22.9% 
year-on-year in the first quarter of 2014, and decreasing to 7.35% by the third 
quarter of the year (Loos & Swanepoel, 2015:3). The implementation of the NCA 
on 1 June 2007 accounted for the lower growth in mortgage advances in the 
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second half of the year due to the strict criteria used to evaluate home loan 
applications (Pillay, 2009:88). In a study on the NCA, Pillay (2009:88) reports 
that growth in mortgage advances to the household sector was slightly lower at 
19.9% year-on-year from 20.0% year-on-year in September and the unpaid 
amount of mortgage balances in the household sector was R692.2 billion in 
October, having a share of 72.5% in total mortgage debt. The mortgage market 
has seen two growth flows since the 2008/9 recession, one in about 2010 in 
response to aggressive interest rate cuts by the SARB in late 2008/2009, and 
the second flow beginning in about 2012/13 (Loos & Swanepoel, 2015:2). 
A strong negative relationship exists because the correlation coefficient r = -1.00 
for period 2007 to 2008, as depicted in Table 5.1 (Pillay, 2009:90). This explains 
that the interest rates had a minimal effect on the performance of mortgage ad-
vances, although, post-implementation of the NCA, the value of r strengthened 
considerably, indicating a stronger relationship between these variables (Pillay, 
2009:90). This also proves the objective that the NCA had an effect because 
fewer mortgages were approved. 
Table 5.1:  Key variables in respect of mortgage advances 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mortgage interest 
rates (x) 
% 11.3 10.6 11.2 13.2 15.1 
Mortgage advances 
(end of period) (y) 
Normal % 
change 
24.5 28.6 30.4 25.3 13.2 
Correlation 
coefficient r 
r = 
SP
√SS x SSY
   -0.3465  -1.00 
Source:  Pillay (2009:90) 
To examine the trend of residential mortgages after the implementation of the 
NCA was objective 3. To achieve objective 3, Figure 5.5 shows that there was a 
growth in the number of new residential mortgage advances granted in January 
2008, but then it systematically dropped until January 2009; the financial crisis 
and interest rates could be some of the external factors that played a role. 
There was a small recovery in 2010, but another slowdown was experienced 
into 2011 as the effect of the financial crisis continued to impact the economy 
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(Landie, 2013:3). The number of new residential mortgage advances systema-
tically dropped and then recovered in January 2013, but dropped at an in-
creasing rate until January 2014. The residential mortgage market continued its 
slowdown in the final quarter of 2014, in relation to new lending, with SARB 
data displaying the growth in the value of new residential loans granted having 
decreased to 1.3% year-on-year from 8.7% in the former quarter (NCR, 2013:7). 
The SARB Leading Business Cycle Indicator, which most of the time correlates 
quite well with new mortgage lending, portrays a depressed picture because two 
post-recession growth resurgences were experienced; the big one in 2009/10 
and a more lenient one in 2012/13, both leading to higher residential mortgage 
growth (Loos & Swanepoel, 2015:9). 
 
Figure 5.5:  Number of new residential mortgage advances approved 
The values of new residential mortgage advances granted, seen in Figure 5.6, 
follow the same trend as the number of new residential mortgage advances 
granted. The values of residential mortgages granted dropped significantly after 
the NCA. 
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Figure 5.6:  Value of new residential mortgage advances granted 
To achieve the fourth research objective, namely to determine the effect of the 
implementation of the NCA on further advances on residential mortgages. 
Figure 5.7 gives the distribution of the pre- and post-NCA scores of the further 
advances (in numbers) on residential bonds registered. From January 2001 and 
just before the implementation of the NCA there was an increase in further 
advances. After implementation of the NCA, the number of further advances on 
bonds decreased. From September 2008 it gradually dropped until June 2011. 
 
Figure 5.7:  Further advances – Total number of residential bonds registered 
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Figure 5.8 displays the values for further advances on bonds registered. The 
figure displays a similar trend to the number of further advances. From January 
2001 and before the implementation of the NCA, the values of further advances 
increased. The values dropped post-NCA and from September 2008 the values 
of further advances decreased steadily. The NCA had a positive effect on fur-
ther advances because the number and values of bonds dropped. 
 
Figure 5.8:  Further advances – Value of residential bonds registered (Rands) 
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics in Table 5.2 show the means for the pre- and post-NCA 
periods for objective 1. The mean for the pre-NCA period is 27321.1 and that for 
the post-NCA period is 19750.2. This shows that the chances of an application 
being approved before the NCA was introduced were higher than in the post-
NCA period. Although the highest number of bonds was issued in the post-NCA 
period (Max = 48926.0), on average, the reduced mean score of 19750.2 from 
27321.1 in the pre-NCA period shows that after the introduction of the NCA 
fewer bonds were issued than in the period before the NCA came into effect. 
The standard deviation of the post-NCA period is10680.5 compared to the pre-
NCA period, which is 7346.2. 
These results point towards the desired positive effect of slowing down the 
money supply towards mortgage lending by introducing the NCA. They are in 
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line with theoretical submissions that the credit supply may be limited by regu-
latory interventions. 
Table 5.2: Bonds issued in the pre- and post-NCA periods 
Pre-NCA Post-NCA 
Variable Mean Std dev Min Max Mean Std dev Min Max 
Volume 27321.1 7346.2 14162.0 42951.0 19750.2 10680.5 9558.0 48926.0 
Value 8.157E9 3.6648E9 2.9681E9 1.597E10 1.238E10 6.0314E9 5.9895E9 2.83E10 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 5.3 show the means for the pre- and post-NCA 
periods for the total value of registered bonds. The mean for the pre-NCA period 
is 8.1579E9, while that for the post-NCA period is 1.238E10. This implies that 
the chances of an application being approved before the introduction of the 
NCA were higher than in the post-NCA period under review. The SD for the pre-
NCA is 3.6648E9 and post-NCA is 6.0314E9. 
Table 5.3: Total value of residential bonds registered (Rands) 
V2 N Mean Std dev Std err Minimum Maximum 
Pre-NCA 51 8.1579E9 3.6648E9 5.1318E8 2.9681E9 1.597E10 
Post-NCA 51 1.238E10 6.0314E9 8.4457E8 5.9895E9 2.83E10 
Diff (1-2)  -4.221E9 4.9904E9 9.8825E8   
 
Table 5.4 gives more or less the same information, except that it includes the 
confidence intervals for the means and standard deviations for the pre-NCA and 
post-NCA periods. The standard deviation, which is an indication of the average 
distance from the mean, indicates that it was less for the pre-NCA (3.6648E9) 
than for the post-NCA period (6.0314E9). 
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Table 5.4: Total value of residential bonds registered (includes the confidence intervals) 
V2 Method Mean 95% CL mean Std dev 95% CL std dev 
Pre-
NCA 
 8.1579E9 7.1272E9 9.1887E9 3.6648E9 3.0664E9 4.5556E9 
Post-
NCA 
 1.238E10 1.068E10 1.408E10 6.0314E9 5.0465E9 7.4975E9 
Diff 
(1-2) 
Pooled -4.221E9 -6.182E9 -2.261E9 4.9904E9 4.3843E9 5.7926E9 
Diff 
(1-2) 
Satter- 
thwaite 
-4.221E9 -6.187E9 -2.256E9    
 
5.4 TEST FOR NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
A test for normality was done to determine if data was normally distributed. The 
results of the normality test informed the subsequent choice between the para-
metric or non-parametric test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov, a non-parametric test, 
was used to determine if data was normally distributed. Further tests for nor-
mality were conducted using the Shapiro Wilk (W), Cramer-von Mises (W-Sq) 
and Anderson Darling (A-Sq) for robustness. Table 5.5 below presents the sum-
marised results for the normality test. All the tests confirm that the data was 
normally distributed with p-values less than 0.05.  
Table 5.5: Normality test 
Variable 
Shapiro-
Wilk (W) 
p-value 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (D) 
p-value 
Cramer-
von Mises 
(W-Sq) 
p-value 
Anderson 
Darling  
(A-Sq) 
p-value 
No. of residen-
tial bonds 
0.939965 0.0002 0.11774 <0.0100 0.255103 <0.0050 1.798963 ˂0.0050 
Total value of 
bonds 
0.876332 ˂0.0001 0.163532 ˂0.0100 0.642979 ˂0.0050 3.706181 ˂0.0050 
No. of further 
advances 
0.841779 ˂0.0001 0.186221 ˂0.0100 1.010624 ˂0.0050 5.815864 ˂0.0050 
Value of further 
advances 
0.799526 ˂0.0001 0.248153 ˂0.0100 1.367333 ˂0.0050 7.246316 ˂0.0050 
 
5.5 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
The first objective of the study was to determine the effect of the NCA on mort-
gage lending. A correlation analysis of the variables used to test this objective 
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was conducted using the Pearson correlation test. Results of the pre-NCA period 
are presented in Table 5.6 below. 
5.5.1 Pre-NCA period correlation analysis 
Results for the pre-NCA period in Table 5.6 show that there is a positive rela-
tionship between the number of residential bonds registered and the pre-NCA 
period (r = .704; p > .05). These results imply that the number of residential 
bonds issued increased during that period. There is a strong positive relationship 
between the value of residential bonds registered and the pre-NCA period (r = 
,921; p > .05), which means that the value of residential bonds increased during 
that period. There is a positive relationship between the number of registered 
bonds and the value of residential bonds registered (r = ,874; p > .05), sug-
gesting that an increase in the number of residential bonds registered led to an 
increase in the value of residential bonds registered. There was an increase in 
the numbers and values of bonds registered during pre-NCA. Overall, these 
results confirm the NCA has had a positive influence on the supply of residential 
mortgages. 
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Table 5.6: Pre-NCA correlation analysis 
Correlationsa 
 
Date 
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
regisdtered 
Value of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Further 
advances – 
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
Further 
advances – 
Valueof 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Date 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 
 
 
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
    
N 51     
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.704** 1  
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
   
N 51 51    
Value of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.921** .874** 1 
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000    
N 51 51 51   
Further 
advances – 
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.879** .726** .945** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
N 51 51 51 51  
Further 
advances – 
Valueof 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.891** .696** .941** .993** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 51 51 51 51 51 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
a
 Period = Pre 
 
5.5.2 Post-NCA period correlation analysis 
Looking at the post-NCA correlation analysis in Table 5.7, there is a negative 
correlation between the number of residential bonds registered and post-NCA 
period (r = -.711 p < .05), as the periods in which the NCA was applied scored 
lower approval ratios than prior to the NCA. There is a negative correlation 
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between the value of residential bonds registered and post-NCA period (r =  
-.631; p < .05); there was a drop in the value of residential bonds registered 
after the implementation of the NCA. There is a strong positive relationship 
between the number and the value of residential bonds registered (r = ,992; p > 
.05), suggesting that an increase in the number of residential bonds registered 
led to an increase in the value of residential bonds registered. 
Further advances showed a strong positive correlation with the pre-NCA period. 
The coefficient for further advances in rand value was found to be 0.891. Simi-
larly, the further advances in volume terms was observed to be positively 
related with the pre-NCA period. The relationship was found to be significant at 
a 95% confidence level. These results suggest that in the absence of regulatory 
controls, consumers were inclined to borrow more money for the construction of 
residential properties. In order to test the effect of the NCA on mortgages, data 
in respect of mortgage lending after the introduction of the NCA was analysed. 
The results are presented below in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.7: Post-NCA correlation analysis 
Correlationsa 
 
Date 
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
regisdtered 
Value of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Further 
advances – 
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
Further 
advances – 
Valueof 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Date 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 
 
 
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
    
N 51     
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
regisdtered 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.711** 1  
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
   
N 51 51    
Value of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.631** .992** 1 
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000    
N 51 51 51   
Further 
advances – 
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.824** .957** .928** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
N 51 51 51 51  
Further 
advances – 
Valueof 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.827** .970** .943** .996** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 51 51 51 51 51 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
a
 Period = Post 
 
The period from January 2008 to January 2014 was reviewed and results of the 
correlation analysis are presented in Table 5.8. There is a strong negative 
correlation between the number of mortgage advances applied for and post-
NCA period (r = -.360; p < .05), which means that after the implementation of 
the NCA, the mortgages applied for dropped considerably. A strong negative 
correlation is revealed between the total number of mortgage advances granted 
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and post-NCA period (r = -.472; p < .05). This means that the total number of 
mortgage advances dropped following the introduction of the NCA. There is 
also a strong relationship between the number of mortgage advances applied 
for and the total number of mortgage advances granted (r = ,898; p > .05) and 
the relationship is observed to be positive and significant, suggesting that an 
increase in the number of mortgage advances applied for led to an increase in 
the total number of mortgage advances granted. This explains that the number 
of mortgage advances applied for had an effect on the performance of total 
mortgage advances granted, indicating a stronger relationship between these 
variables. The summarised correlations are presented in Table 5.8 below. 
Table 5.8: Number of mortgage advances applied for and total number of mortgage advances 
granted 
 
Period 
Number of 
mortgage 
advances 
applied for 
Total 
number of 
mortgage 
advances 
granted 
Period 
Pearson Correlation 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
  
N 73   
Number of 
mortgage 
advances 
applied for 
Pearson Correlation -.360**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
  
N 73 73 
 
Total number 
of mortgage 
advances 
granted 
Pearson Correlation -.472** .898** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
 
N 73 73 73 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Further relationships were analysed for the post-NCA period. Results are pre-
sented in Table 5.9 and reported in the sections that follow. 
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Table 5.9: Correlations 
 
Period 
Value of 
new 
residential 
mortgage 
advaces 
granted 
Value of re-
advances 
on 
residential 
mortgages 
granted 
Number of 
new 
residential 
mortgage 
advances 
granted 
Number of 
re-
advances 
on 
residential 
mortgages 
granted 
Period (Jan 
2008 ‒ Jan 
2014 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1     
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
    
N 73     
Value of 
new 
residential 
mortgage 
advances 
granted 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.182     
Sig. (2-tailed) .124 
 
   
N 73 73    
Value of re-
advances 
on residen-
tial mort-
gages 
granted 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.830** .517**    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000    
N 73 73 73   
Number of 
new resi-
dential 
mortgage 
advances 
granted 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.351** .935** .548**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .000 .000   
N 73 73 73 73  
Number of 
re-
advances 
on residen-
tial mort-
gages 
granted 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.794** .646** .813** .786** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 73 73 73 73 73 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
5.5.2.1 NCA and value of re-advances on residential mortgages granted 
In Table 5.9, the correlation is from January 2008 to January 2014. There is a 
strong negative correlation between value of re-advances on residential mort-
gages granted and period (r = -.830; p < .05), which means there were lower 
104 
approval ratios after the NCA. Similarly, there is a strong negative correlation 
between the number of re-advances on residential mortgages granted and post-
NCA period (r = -.794; p < .05). 
5.5.2.2 NCA and new residential mortgages 
There is a negative correlation between the number of new residential mortgage 
advances granted and period (r = -.351; p < .05) as depicted in Table 5.9. This 
result implies that the number of new residential mortgage advances granted 
dropped significantly after the NCA came into effect. 
5.5.2.3 Value of re-advances on residential mortgages granted and value of 
new residential mortgage advances granted 
There is a positive relationship between value of re-advances on residential 
mortgages granted and value of new residential mortgage advances granted  
(r = ,517; p > .05). This means that the value of new residential mortgage ad-
vances granted had an effect on the value of re-advances on residential mort-
gage advances granted as depicted in Table 5.9. 
5.5.2.4 Number of new residential mortgage advances granted and value of 
new residential mortgage advances granted 
There is a strong relationship between the number of new residential mortgage 
advances granted and the value of new residential mortgage advances granted 
(r = ,935; p > .05), which is observed to be positive and significant. This sug-
gests that an increase in the number of new mortgage advances granted led to 
an increase in the value of new residential mortgage advances granted as de-
picted in Table 5.9. 
5.5.2.5 Number of new residential mortgage advances granted and value of 
re-advances on residential mortgages granted 
There is a positive relationship between the number of new residential mort-
gage advances granted and the value of re-advances on residential mortgages 
granted (r = ,548; p > .05). This means that when the number of new residential 
mortgage advances granted increased, the value of re-advances on residential 
mortgages granted also increased as depicted in Table 5.9. 
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5.5.2.6 Number of re-advances on residential mortgages granted and value of 
re-advances on residential mortgages granted 
There is a positive relationship between the number of re-advances on residen-
tial mortgages granted and the value of re-advances on residential mortgages 
granted (r = ,813; p > .05). This means that when the number of re-advances on 
residential mortgages granted increased, the value of re-advances on residen-
tial mortgages granted also increased as depicted in Table 5.9. 
5.5.2.7 Number of new residential mortgage advances granted and number of 
re-advances on residential mortgages granted 
There is a strong relationship between the number of new residential mortgage 
advances granted and the number of re-advances on residential mortgages 
granted (r = ,786; p > .05). This relationship is observed to be positive and 
significant, suggesting that an increase in the number of new mortgage ad-
vances granted led to an increase in the number of re-advances on residential 
mortgages granted as depicted in Table 5.9.  
5.5.2.8 Number of re-advances on residential mortgages granted and value of 
new residential mortgage advances granted 
There is a strong positive relationship between the number of re-advances on 
residential mortgages granted and the value of new residential mortgage ad-
vances granted (r = ,646; p > .05). This suggests that an increase in the number 
of re-advances on residential mortgages granted led to an increase in the value 
of new residential mortgage advances granted as depicted in Table 5.9. 
5.5.2.9 Number of mortgage advances applied for and number of new 
residential mortgage advances granted 
There is a strong positive correlation between the number of mortgage ad 
vances applied for and the number of new residential mortgage advances 
granted (r = ,886; p > .05), as depicted in Table 5.10. This explains that the 
number of mortgage advances applied for had an effect on the performance of 
the number of new residential mortgage advances granted, indicating a stronger 
relationship between these variables. 
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Table 5.10:  Correlations 
 Number of 
mortgage 
advances 
applied for 
Number of new 
residential mort-
gage advances 
granted 
Number of mortgage 
advances applied for 
Pearson Correlation 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 73  
Number of new 
residential mortgage 
advances granted 
Pearson Correlation .886** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 73 73 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
5.5.2.10 Number and value of residential bonds registered using further 
advances 
Correlation analysis for objective 4 was done for the whole period without 
division, from January 2001 to August 2011, as seen in Table 5.11. There is a 
strong positive relationship between the number of further advances on residen-
tial bonds registered and the values of further advances on residential bonds 
registered (r = ,868; p > .05). This means that the number of further advances 
on residential bonds had an effect on the values of further advances on residen-
tial bonds registered, indicating a stronger relationship between these variables. 
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Table 5.11:  Correlations – further advances 
Period (January 2001 –  
August 2011 
Period 
Further 
advances – 
Number of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
Further 
advances – 
Value of 
residential 
bonds 
registered 
(Rands) 
Period 
Pearson Correlation 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
  
N 102   
Further advances – 
Number of resi-
dential bonds 
registered 
Pearson Correlation -.164 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .100 
  
N 102 102 
 
Further advances – 
Value of residential 
bonds registered 
(Rands) 
Pearson Correlation .193 .868** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .052 .000 
 
N 102 102 102 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Looking at the correlations for pre-NCA in Table 5.6, there is a positive re-
lationship between the number of further advances on bonds registered and 
pre-NCA period (r = ,879; p > .05), which means that the number of further 
advances on bonds increased during that period. There is a strong positive 
relationship between the value of further advances on bonds registered and 
pre-NCA period (r = ,891; p > .05), which means that the value of residential 
bonds increased during that period. There is a positive relationship between the 
number of further advances on registered bonds and the value of further ad-
vances on residential bonds registered (r = ,993; p > .05), suggesting that an 
increase in the number of further advances on residential bonds registered led 
to an increase in the value of further advances on residential bonds registered. 
Regarding the correlations for post-NCA in Table 5.7, there is a negative 
correlation between the number of further advances on residential bonds regis-
tered and post-NCA period (r = -.824; p < .05), as the periods in which the NCA 
was applied scored lower approval ratios than the period pre-NCA. There is a 
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negative correlation between the value of further advances on residential bonds 
registered and post-NCA period (r = -.827; p < .05), as there was a drop in the 
value of further advances on residential bonds registered after the implemen-
tation of the NCA. There is a strong positive relationship between the number of 
further advances on registered bonds and the value of further advances on 
residential bonds registered (r = ,996; p > .05), suggesting that an increase in 
the number of further advances on residential bonds registered led to an in-
crease in the value of further advances on residential bonds registered. 
5.6 T-TEST RESULTS 
The results for the t-test are presented per hypothesis stated in the methodol-
ogy chapter.To draw a comparison between pre- and post-NCA to see if there 
was a change in residential mortgage lending each of the hypotheses is re-
stated for ease of reference. 
 H0:  The means for the two groups of data sets representing the pre- and 
post-NCA periods are equal. 
 Ha:  The means are not equal. The Satterthwaite test was used to test to see 
if the variances were unequal. To determine whether the difference in mean 
is statistically significant, the t-test was performed as presented in Table 5.12. 
The H0 is rejected for both numbers and values because Pr < (0.0001), which 
is less than 0.05 as depicted in Table 5.12. The t-test is used when there 
are two independent samples or categories. There is a significant difference 
in the approval ratio of means of the pre- and post-NCA applications. 
Table 5.12:  Variances 
Method Variances DF t-value Pr > |t| 
Pooled Equal 100 4.17 <.0001 
Satterthwaite Unequal 88.657 4.17 <.0001 
 
From Table 5.12 above, it can be seen that Pr < (0.0001), which is less than 
0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the mean scores for the pre- and post-
NCA period are equal is rejected. 
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5.6.1 Standard deviation 
The smaller the standard deviation, the closer the data lies to the mean, and 
thus the tighter the spread of the data (Pieterse, 2009:126). The standard devia-
tion, which is an indication of the average distance from the mean, for the pre-
NCA period (7346.2) is less than that for the post-NCA period (10680.5). Table 
5.13 below illustrates this. 
Table 5.13:  Total number of residential bonds registered 
V2 N Mean Std dev Std err Minimum Maximum 
Pre-NCA 51 27321.1 7346.2 1028.7 14162.0 42951.0 
Post-NCA 51 19750.2 10680.5 1495.6 9558.0 48926.0 
Diff (1-2)  7570.9 9166.2 1815.2   
Test for equality of variance 
5.6.2 Hypothesis 1:  The variances for the pre- and post-NCA 
periods are equal 
It seems that there is a significant difference in the approval ratio of means of 
the periods pre- and post-NCA. As seen in Table 5.14, the test for equality of 
variance shows that Pr < F (0.0006), which is less than 0.05. The null hypothe-
sis that the variances are equal for the two groups is therefore rejected. 
Table 5.14:  Equality of variances (further tests for significance) 
Equality of variances 
Method Num DF Den DF F-value Pr > F 
Folded F 50 50 2.71 0.0006 
 
5.6.3 Test for variances between Pre- and Post-NCA periods 
The variances are unequal and significant because P < 0.0001 as shown in 
Table 5.15 below. Given the fact that variances between the two groups are 
unequal, the Satterthwaite test was used to test for mean difference. 
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Table 5.15:  Variances between pre- and post-NCA periods 
Method Variances DF t-value Pr > |t| 
Pooled Equal 100 -4.27 <.0001 
Satterthwaite Unequal 82.491 -4.27 <.0001 
 
The NCA, which was effective from June 2007, had an impact on residential 
mortgage financing in South Africa because the number of mortgages dropped, 
as depicted in Figure 5.1. In Chapter 3 (literature review) it was stated that banks 
cannot just approve mortgages like they did before the NCA came into effect. 
Under the NCA, consumers must make a deposit when they want to buy a 
house. The criteria for lending have become more stringent with the implemen-
tation of the NCA, and are now based on affordability after taking household 
and living expenses into consideration. It was found that following the applica-
tion of the NCA, it is more difficult to obtain mortgages and vehicle financing, as 
credit applicants have to show that they earn enough income to cover the new 
instalment in addition to all their existing monthly expenses (Pieterse, 2009:160). 
Descriptive statistics in Table 5.16 show the means pre- and post-NCA. The 
pre-NCA mean is 27321.1 and the post-NCA mean is 19750.2. It seems that the 
chances of an application being approved before the NCA were higher than 
post-NCA. The standard deviation, which is an indication of the average dis-
tance from the mean, for pre-NCA (7346.2) is less than post-NCA (10680.5). 
Table 5.16:  Total number of residential bonds registered (includes the confidence intervals) 
V2 Method Mean 95% CL mean Std dev 95% CL std dev 
Pre-NCA  27321.1 25255.0 29387.3 7346.2 6146.6 9131.9 
Post-NCA  19750.2 16746.3 22754.1 10680.5 8936.4 13276.7 
Diff (1-2) Pooled 7570.9 3969.7 11172.2 9166.2 8052.9 10639.6 
Diff (1-2) Satterthwaite 7570.9 3964.0 11177.8    
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5.7 TEST FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCE 
The study hypothesised that the variances for the pre- and post-NCA mort-
gages are the same. Table 5.17 below presents the results for the test for 
equality of variance. Since Pr < F (0.0092) is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis 
that the variances are equal for the two groups is rejected. Given the fact that 
variances between the two groups are unequal, the Satterthwaite test was used 
to test for mean difference. The variances are unequal and significant because 
P< 0.0001, as shown in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17:  Equality of variances 
Equality of variances 
Method Num DF Den DF F-value Pr > F 
Folded F 50 50 2.11 0.0092 
 
5.8 OBJECTIVE 4:  NCA AND FURTHER ADVANCES 
The fourth objective of the study was to determine the effect of the implemen-
tation of the NCA on further advances on mortgages in South Africa. Descriptive 
statistics for the number and value of further advances were used to analyse 
the data. In order to test this objective, the following null and alternate hypoth-
eses were postulated: 
 H0:  The NCA has no effect on further advances. 
 H1:  The NCA has an effect on further advances. 
To determine whether the difference in means was statistically significant, the t-
test was performed as presented in the above tables. From Table 5.18 below it 
can be seen that Pr > (0.0987), which is more than 0.05. The null hypothesis 
that the mean scores for post- and pre-NCA are equal and is therefore accepted. 
The period prior to the NCA had the highest number of further advances on 
bonds registered compared to post-NCA. 
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Table 5.18:  Variances 
Method Variances DF t-value Pr > |t| 
Pooled Equal 100 1.67 0.0987 
Satterthwaite Unequal 97.326 1.67 0.0988 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 5.19 below show the pre- and post-NCA 
means for number of further advances. The mean for pre-NCA is 6575.8 and 
that for post-NCA is 5430.9. It seems that the chances of an application being 
approved before the NCA were higher than post-NCA. 
Table 5.19:  Further advances – number of residential bonds registered; mean scores between 
pre- and post-NCA 
V2 N Mean Std dev Std err Minimum Maximum 
Pre-NCA 51 6575.8 3168.5 443.7 2815.0 13978.0 
Post-NCA 51 5430.9 3745.5 524.5 2392.0 15714.0 
Diff (1-2)  1144.9 3469.1 687.0   
 
Table 5.20 gives more or less the same information, except that it includes the 
confidence intervals for the means and standard deviations for pre- and post-
NCA. The pre-NCA period had the highest number of further advances on 
bonds registered compared to post-NCA. The standard deviation for pre-NCA 
(3168.5) was less than post-NCA (3745.5). 
Table 5.20:  Confidence intervals for the means and standard deviations 
V2 Method Mean 95% CL mean Std dev 95% CL std dev 
Pre-NCA  6575.8 5684.6 7467.0 3168.5 2651.1 3938.7 
Post-NCA  5430.9 4377.4 6484.3 3745.5 3133.9 4656.0 
Diff (1-2) Pooled 1144.9 -218.0 2507.8 3469.1 3047.7 4026.7 
Diff (1-2) Satterthwaite 1144.9 -218.5 2508.3    
 
The mean for the values of further advances for pre-NCA is 1.0969E9, while 
that for the post-NCA period is 1.7607E9 (see Table 5.21). The mean is higher 
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for the post-NCA period than the pre-NCA period, which means that the values 
increased after the implementation of the NCA. 
Table 5.21:  Further advances – value of residential bonds registered (Rands) 
V2 N Mean Std dev Std err Minimum Maximum 
Pre-NCA 51 1.0969E9 7.3919E8 1.0351E8 3.3218E8 2.8695E9 
Post-NCA 51 1.7607E9 1.2139E9 1.6998E8 7.3854E8 4.8984E9 
Diff (1-2)  -6.638E8 1.005E9 1.9902E8   
 
Table 5.22 gives more or less the same information, except that it includes the 
confidence intervals for the means and standard deviations for the pre-NCA and 
post-NCA periods. The standard deviation for pre-NCA (7.3919E8) was more 
than that for the post-NCA period (1.2139E9). 
Table 5.22:  Further advances confidence intervals for the means and standard deviations 
V2 Method Mean 95% CL mean Std dev 95% CL std dev 
Pre-NCA  1.0969E9 8.8904E8 1.3048E9 7.3919E8 6.1848E8 9.1887E8 
Post-NCA  1.7607E9 1.4193E9 2.1022E9 1.2139E9 1.0157E9 1.509E9 
Diff (1-2) Pooled -6.638E8 -1.059E9 -2.689E8 1.005E9 8.8293E8 1.1665E9 
Diff (1-2) Satterthwaite -6.638E8 -1.06E9 -2.679E8    
 
5.9 TEST FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCE FOR VALUE OF 
FURTHER ADVANCES FOR PRE- AND POST-NCA 
PERIODS 
In this section, the hypothesis is that the variances between the two periods are 
equal. Results show that there is a significant difference in the approval ratio 
means of the two periods. Table 5.22 below shows the results for the test for 
equality of variance. 
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Table 5.23:  Equality of variances 
Equality of variances 
Method Num DF Den DF F-value Pr > F 
Folded F 50 50 2.70 0.0006 
 
Since Pr < F (0.0006) is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis that the variances 
are equal for the two groups is rejected. Given the fact that variances between 
the two groups are unequal, the Satterthwaite test was used to test for mean 
difference as depicted in Table 5.24. 
Table 5.24:  Variances 
Method Variances DF t-value Pr > |t| 
Pooled Equal 100 -3.34 0.0012 
Satterthwaite Unequal 82.957 -3.34 0.0013 
 
For Objective 4, it has been proved that the NCA had a positive effect on further 
advances because fewer further advances were approved. 
5.10 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the results of the study were presented and discussed. From the 
results, it is evident that the NCA did impact the lending of financing for houses 
in South Africa. In objective 1 the NCA had a positive effect on the number of 
residential bonds registered. In objective 2 the NCA had an effect on the ac-
ceptance rates of total mortgage lending because there was a drop in the mort-
gages approved. In objective 3 there was a drop in the residential mortgages 
after the implementation of the NCA. In objective 4, the NCA had a positive ef-
fect on further advances mortgages because there was a dropped in the bonds. 
The next chapter presents the conclusion of the study, limitations and recom-
mendations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, South Africa attained political independence from a regime that dis-
criminated and thus disadvantaged the majority of its population. One of the 
areas in which South Africans were disadvantaged was access to decent 
accommodation due to the non-availability of mortgage finance. However, the 
dawn of democracy ushered in more players in the credit market. Some lenders 
could not cope with increasing competition for clients. As a result of the stiff 
competition, normal affordability tests were neglected, leading to many borrow-
ers defaulting. To curb the increase in defaulting borrowers, the government 
introduced the National Credit Act in 2007. The aim of the NCA is to protect 
consumers from reckless lending. 
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of the NCA on residential 
mortgage lending in South Africa. The study was motivated by the increasing 
level of household debt in the aftermath of the introduction of the NCA. Speci-
fically, this study examined the impact of the NCA on residential mortgage 
financing by South African banks. 
Following the main objective of the study as stated above, the second objective 
of the study was to determine whether the implementation of the NCA affected 
the acceptance rates of total mortgage lending. In the third objective, the study 
examined the trends in total residential mortgage financing and the last objec-
tive is the relationship between the NCA and further advances. 
In order to test the hypothesis of there being no positive relationship between 
credit regulation (the NCA) and household mortgage financing in South Africa, 
time series secondary data was obtained mainly from the South African Reserve 
Bank. Data analysis was conducted using trends, descriptive statistics, correla-
tion analysis and inferential statistics. 
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the findings are summarised in 
section 6.2. The limitations of the study are outlined in section 6.3, followed by 
the recommendations for policy and further study in section 6.4. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
6.2.1 Relationship between the NCA and residential mortgage 
financing 
The main objective of the study was to examine the relationship between the 
NCA and the level of residential mortgage financing in South Africa. To achieve 
this objective, data analysis was conducted on the pre-NCA period and the 
post-NCA period. The purpose of the two-period approach was to determine if 
there was a change in residential mortgage lending after the introduction of the 
NCA. Results show that the NCA did have a positive impact on mortgage lend-
ing in South Africa, implying that the demand for mortgage finance declined. 
However, for banks, the decline in residential mortgage portfolios represents a 
negative impact due to losses of potential interest income. After the introduction 
of the NCA, there was a decline in total mortgages approved. 
The trend analysis shows that there was a drop in the number of registered 
bonds from January 2001 to January 2002. An increase was observed from 
April 2002 to January 2005. However, from 2008, the number of registered 
bonds declined rapidly until 2011. 
6.2.2 Relationship between the NCA and acceptance rate of 
mortgage advances 
The second objective of the study was to determine whether implementation of 
the NCA affected the acceptance rates of total mortgage lending. The total 
mortgages approved from January 2008 to January 2014 were examined. The 
results show that the NCA affected the acceptance rates and that there was a 
decline in these rates. 
6.2.3 Trends in residential mortgage financing 
The trend analysis shows that there was growth in the number of new residen-
tial mortgage advances granted in January 2008, but then it systematically 
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dropped until January 2009. There was a small recovery in 2010, but there was 
a slowdown in 2011. It then systematically dropped and recovered in January 
2013, but dropped at an increasing rate until January 2014. The residential 
mortgages granted therefore dropped significantly after the NCA. 
6.2.4 Relationship between the NCA and further advances 
The fourth objective was to determine the effect of the implementation of the 
NCA on further advances. The pre-NCA period had the highest number of fur-
ther advance bonds registered compared to post-NCA. The chances of an 
application being approved before the NCA were higher than post-NCA. 
The trend shows that from January 2001 to just before the implementation of 
the NCA there was an increase in further advances. After the implementation of 
the NCA, the number of further advances decreased. From September 2008 it 
gradually dropped until June 2011. 
Based on the findings above, this study concludes that when the credit market 
is not regulated, lenders tend to neglect the recommended lending practices. 
This negligence, often referred to as reckless lending, leads to lenders focusing 
on growing their loan book at the expense of the quality of the assets. The 
result is that borrowers default, leading to foreclosures. With specific reference 
to South Africa, the study concludes that the introduction of the National Credit 
Act in 2007 brought sanity to the credit market, reducing the number of mort-
gage loan approvals due to the implementation of more stringent requirements 
for applicants to access residential mortgage finance. 
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
One limitation of the study is that the behaviour and trend of mortgage lending 
cannot only be explained by the NCA. There are a number of factors or rather 
intervening factors other than the NCA that could have affected mortgage 
lending. The challenge would be to separate the effect of such factors from 
those of the NCA. These factors could include the increase in interest rates and 
inflation. The financial crisis in the USA and Europe could also have played a 
role. 
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6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.4.1 Recommendations to banks 
Housing plays a very important part in the economy of a country. Banks are the 
primary finance tool for consumers to get access to housing and for this reason 
banks must charge affordable interest on loans. In this study it was found that it 
is difficult for the lower income groups to get housing financing. Banks must get 
more involved in the lower income groups by charging affordable interest rates. 
6.4.2 Recommendations to the NCR 
This study recommends the simplification of the NCA in order to create a better 
understanding of the NCA. When this happens, consumers will be able to make 
informed borrowing decisions. The NCR can create more awareness campaigns 
and offer education programmes to improve consumer education on credit and 
financial issues. Debt counselling must also be promoted extensively to avoid 
borrower default and asset repossessions. 
6.4.3 Recommendations for future research 
 This study was based only on the effect of the NCA on banks. Future re-
search could examine its effect on consumers. 
 This study was based only on banks, but it would be interesting to deter-
mine the effect of the NCA on the property market. 
 This was a quantitative research study. An in-depth qualitative as well as 
quantitative research could be carried out in future. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the main findings on the impact of the NCA on resi-
dential mortgage lending in South Africa. Recommendations were provided for 
further research by interested parties and it also provided limitations in light of 
earlier empirical studies. The main objective of this study was to investigate 
whether residential mortgage financing has become more difficult since the 
implementation of the NCA. The NCA had a negative impact on the banks 
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because there was a decrease in the number registered bonds. The answer is 
that it is indeed more difficult for banks to grant mortgage finance to consumers 
since the implementation of the NCA. Stringent criteria are in place to prevent 
reckless lending. 
From the study it can be seen that residential mortgages dropped after the 
implementation of the Act. Similar studies by Pieterse (2009), Pillay (2009) and 
Rossouw (2008) conclude that the NCA has impacted the South African market 
positively, be it vehicle financing, mortgages or micro lending. The NCA is posi-
tive legislation and its purpose is to protect consumers against reckless lending 
and to create a fair credit market. This means that regulation must be fair and 
trading in the market must be efficient and competitive.This will positively contri-
bute to the academic field of knowledge and provide new ideas to the banks 
and the NCA. 
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